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 Since the 1994 Chechen war, analysts have written volumes about the evolution 
of—and lessons learned from—this ongoing conflict.  Why has success eluded this Cold 
War superpower in subduing the small Caucasian republic?  Russia has since hiccupped 
back and forth across the spectrum of conflict in the region and the years have provided 
much speculation as to why.  For a decade, researchers have described Chechen terror, 
erosion of the Russian military, and the inconsistent resolve of the Russian population to 
support the Kremlin’s actions.  These are significant independent variables that might 
explain Russian failure in 1994.  However, another less tangible factor—Richard 
Szafranski’s paradigm of Neocortical Warfare—may explain Russia’s poor performance 
in the initial invasion and the improved performance in 1999. 
 To evaluate this concept, the author examines the influences of Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and battlefield 
communications—prime factors in influencing combatants’ perceptions—to gauge these 
factors’ effects on the relative Russian performances in the separate invasions.  He then 
holds the results up to the Neocortical lens to evaluate whether the concept is pertinent to 
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 Since the 1994 Chechen war, analysts have written volumes about the evolution 
of—and lessons learned from—this ongoing conflict.  Why has success eluded a Cold 
War superpower in subduing a small Caucasian republic?  Russia has since hiccupped 
back and forth across the spectrum of conflict in the region and the years have provided 
much speculation as to why.  For a decade, researchers have described Chechen terror, 
erosion of the Russian military, and the inconsistent resolve of the Russian population to 
support the Kremlin’s actions.  These are significant independent variables that might 
explain Russian failure in 1994.  However, another less tangible factor—Richard 
Szafranski’s paradigm of Neocortical Warfare (described in section D of this chapter)—
may explain Russia’s poor performance in the initial invasion and the improved 
performance in 1999. 
 To evaluate this concept, this paper will examine the influences of Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and battlefield 
communications—prime factors in influencing combatants’ perceptions—to gauge these 
factors’ effects on the relative Russian performances in the separate invasions.  In the 
course of this evaluation, the author will attempt to elucidate the interrelationships of 
information warfare, asymmetric warfare, and terror.  He will then hold the results up to 
the Neocortical lens to evaluate whether the concept is pertinent to the ongoing conflict in 
Chechnya. 
A. HISTORY 
Pitted against the determined, resourceful Muslim tribes of the mountains 
and forests of the Central Caucasus, Russia’s military forces compiled a 
frustrating record that reflected many of the difficulties inherent in armed 
conflicts between Western-style, conventional armies and non-Western, 
unconventional forces in theaters lacking a highly developed 
transportation and communications infrastructure common to urbanized 
societies.  Repeated Russian failures, the product of errors and the 
increasingly skillful leadership of the resistance, forced Russian military 
analysts to reexamine their approach.1 
                                                 
1 Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 1. 
2 
 This passage, from Dr. Robert F. Baumann’s Russian-Soviet Unconventional 
Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, was published in 1993 and 
described Russia’s effort to subdue the Caucasus from 1801 to 1864.  Contemporary 
historians and scholars have witnessed obvious parallels to the current Russian push into 
the Caucasus.  Analyst Les Grau, writing in 1995, described more recent events in the 
region, where “[t]he Chechens turned every city, village and hamlet into a fortress and 
inflicted serious casualties on the Russian columns.”2  History has, in many ways, 
repeated itself. 
In 1801, Russia found itself attempting to subjugate elusive mountaineers who 
were “able tacticians on the defense or in staging small guerrilla-type incursions”, whose 
“experience taught them never to engage a superior enemy when he could bring his full 
power to bear but rather to use nature as their ally and lure the enemy into combat on 
unfavorable terms.”3  Russian military officers, confronted by this vexing situation n the 
Caucasus, offered solutions and analyses throughout the 19th century.  Commander of 
Caucasus forces General Ermolov (1816-27) sought to clear and secure roads throughout 
the Caucasus.  A young officer from the General Staff, Captain I. Mochulskii (1837), 
wrote of Chechen spiritual and military prowess in an inhospitable terrain; he described 
bad logistics, training and morale amongst Russian troops.  Another, Captain Dimitrii 
Miliutin (1839-43) advocated better understanding the local culture while promoting 
trade and industry in order to subdue the Caucasian populace.4  In the late 1850s, the 
Russian General and viceroy of the region, Prince Bariatinskii destroyed villages, crops, 
and forests, “leaving the Chechens to choose between death, flight, or settlement on 
Russian territory.”5 
Eventually, staff analysis and dogged resolve facilitated decisive action and the 
Russian empire prevailed, capturing the insurgent leader Shamil in 1859.  The region 
took on many characteristics one identifies with the American western frontier in the 
same era as Saint Petersburg sought to establish control via a collection of military                                                  
2 Lester F. Grau, “Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny,” INSS 
Strategic Forum 38 (July 1995), 4. 
3 Baumann, 7. 
4 Ibid., 19-20. 
5 Ibid., 26. 
3 
outposts.  A tribal native population grumbled under the offered civilization; the imperial 
system, in turn, displayed a particular arrogance toward its new responsibility, 
exemplified by Ermolov’s famous assertion (inscribed on his statue, erected by Stalin in 
Grozny in 1949): “There is no people under the sun more vile and deceitful than this 
one.”6 
Stalin evidently shared Ermolov’s views regarding the Chechens; his paranoia, 
when juxtaposed with the aforementioned difficulties in subduing the Caucasus, 
prompted that people’s mass deportation to Central Asia during the Second World War.  
This was one event in a series of such deportations, which sought “…to remake the ethnic 
map of the Soviet Union through the deportation of whole nationalities, allegedly in the 
interest of security…  In effect, these operations applied the principle of the purge to the 
nationalities; their purpose was to achieve ethnically homogeneous populations in 
sensitive areas, thereby eradicating any putative source of disloyalty.”7 
One can imagine the reaction in a people whose cultural heritage held revenge in 
high regard, especially after having witnessed the end of the mighty Tsarist Empire in the 
1917 revolution.  (The Chechen independence movement grew alongside the Bolsheviks, 
but once Lenin was firmly in power he quashed Chechen nationalism as actively as had 
his predecessors.)  During World War II, Stalin exiled the parents of 1994’s Chechen 
guerrillas and one could surmise that the experience was vividly communicated to the 
next generation: 
They would not have been pushed out into eternal exile so energetically 
and swiftly had it not been that regular army units and military trucks were 
assigned to help the Organs.  The military units gallantly surrounded the 
auls, or settlements, and, within twenty-four hours, with the speed of a 
parachute attack, those who had nested there for centuries past found 
themselves removed to railroad stations, loaded by the trainload, and 
rushed off…  Within one day their land and their property had been turned 
over to their “heirs”… they were exiled solely on the basis of blood.  
There was no filling out of questionnaires; Party members, Heroes of 
                                                 
6 Aleksei Ermolov, quoted in Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus 
(New York: New York University Press, 1998), 62. 
7 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The 
Free Press, 1994), 290. 
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Labor and heroes of the still-unfinished war were all sent along with the 
rest (italics in original).8 
The “heirs” Solzhenitsyn describes were usually ethnic Russians, especially 
petroleum engineers and apparatchiks loyal to Stalin.  These reliable homo sovieticus 
families did indeed move into the vacated Chechen homes and radically changed the 
region’s demography.  When Khrushchev brought the exiles back to Chechnya in 1957, 
each was given 1000 rubles to buy back his home, but the thirteen years away from 
Chechnya had served to galvanize the often-quarreling tribes into a national identity.  
There is nothing that Khrushchev or his successors could have done to prevent or 
mitigate the collective fear of Russian expulsion and occupation that now characterizes 
Chechen nationalism. 
These feelings, like those of other Soviet nationalities, gained a striking 
effervescence in the interim between 1989 and 1991.  As the Berlin Wall dropped and 
Mikhail Gorbachev allowed the Warsaw Pact to crumble along with it, many former 
Soviet Socialist Republics sought and gained independence.  Former Soviet Air Force 
Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev emerged as champion of Chechen secession.  As 
armed groups sprang to life, so did kidnapping and theft; the once-robust Chechen 
economy declined appreciably as petroleum production and distribution subsequently 
grew more problematic—industry professionals simply left and oil transport lost its 
profitability.  The Yeltsin government made hollow threats to “defend constitutional 
order”9 as nationalist fervor skyrocketed and the northern Caucasus grew less civil and 
secure.  By 1992, the Soviet armories in Chechnya had all been looted of their military 
hardware.10 
Fired by nationalism and the desire to secede, hyper-aware of every historical 
offense from the north, rich in national resources and well-armed unemployed males, 
Chechnya was now volatile. 
 
                                                 
8 Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973), 84. 
9 Gaal and deWaal, 98. 
10 Ibid., 113. 
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B. EROSION OF RUSSIAN MILITARY POWER 
The Russian government stood on the brink of utilizing its forces to invade this 
angry republic in its southern periphery.  To preserve the nation’s sovereignty, Russia’s 
military forces would likely be tasked to move into the Chechen capital to capture or 
eradicate the center of resistance.  This effort would, of course, require a capability to 
conduct Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). 
One scholar estimates that “the Soviet Army freed 1,200 cities from the German 
Army”11 in the drive from Stalingrad to the Reichstag.  Commanders had gained the 
knowledge that successful urban warfare necessitated at least a 4:1 ratio in the attack, a 
blockade to seal off the city, and plenty of trained light infantry to seize and defend 
buildings along the line of march.  Fire support from accompanying tanks and artillery 
was essential, as well as a working command, control, and communications apparatus to 
coordinate attacks.12 
By the 1980s, however, Soviet emphasis on urban warfare had withered in favor 
of a more likely mechanized conventional confrontation on the plains of central Europe.  
When Russian troops did move on Chechnya’s capital, however, other problems made 
themselves evident.  The eleventh-hour formation of ad-hoc units to take Grozny not only 
brought confusion to the battle, but also eradicated the possibility of any unit cohesion.  
Soldiers must train together to comprise an effective unit, down to the squad level.; 
grabbing warm bodies from a variety of sources in order to fill assault vehicles directly 
contradicts this practice.  A RAND study compiled in 2001 reveals, however, that this 
dangerous practice existed higher up the chain as well: 
The Russian army was simply in no shape to fight a war.  It had not held a 
divisional or regimental field exercise since 1992.  It suffered tremendous 
shortages of junior officers and qualified NCOs.  The military was 
                                                 
11 V.G. Reznichenko, Taktika (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 326; quoted in Andrei Raevsky, “Russian 
Military Performance in Chechnya: An initial evaluation,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 8, 
No. 4 (December 1995): 682. 
12 Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2001), 6-7. 
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receiving perhaps 30-40 percent of its requirements for funding and 
supplies, and not a single regiment was at full strength.13 
This inadequate training and hastily cobbled order of battle also enabled 
fratricide.  If previously unacquainted infantrymen could not dismount a tracked vehicle 
together and protect it, one can imagine the difficulty in safely calling for fires and close 
air support.  Ineffective night vision capabilities and inadequate maps in the hands of 
armed, untrained, and inexperienced conscripts exacerbated the problem. 
The Russian Air Force, which had destroyed its miniscule Chechen counterpart 
early in hostilities and confronted a hardly formidable air defense system, could not fly in 
adverse weather.  As Russian military affairs expert Pavel Baev writes in his assessment 
of Russian air operations in Chechnya, “on average, during December-February in 
Chechnya there are up to 95 percent of heavy cloud and fog days.”  The most capable 
aircraft over the Chechen battlefield was the Su-24, which, regardless, was hindered by 
the same readiness circumstances.  Baev points out that these pilots held an average of 
only 20-40 flying hours within the previous year, undoubtedly due to vastly curtailed 
funding.  Money was short, but so were supplies; Baev states that only around half the 
required fuel, lubricants, and spare parts were made available to Russian ground crews.  
“In order,” he writes, “to maintain even this minimal level of supplies for a task force of 
roughly 140 combat aircraft, the Air Force Command had to strip the reserves of many 
units in other military districts.”14  A quick downward spiral in Russian Force readiness 
levels ensued, where “cuts in financing inevitably lead to reduced maintenance, and this 
also results in an increased accident rate.”15 
Rotary-wing assets were in similar straits.  The shrinking inventory held largely 
older helicopters and thus necessitated round-the-clock work in available maintenance 
facilities.16  Thus both the Russian air and ground forces revealed marked erosion in 
capability vis-à-vis that of the Cold War.  If one looked at the usual operational factors 
like spare parts, money, and technology, he could predict continued erosion in Russian 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 14. 
14 Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Airpower in the Chechen War: Denial, Punishment, and Defeat,” Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies 10, No. 2 (June 1997): 9. 
15 Ibid., 14. 
16 Oliker, 57. 
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performance.  The improvement between the invasions of 1994 and 1999, however, 
demands that researchers look beyond these reports to assess Russian military operations 
in Chechnya. 
C. CHECHEN USE OF TERROR 
Instances of terrorism are worthy of discussion in any analysis of the Chechnya 
situation, as these changed its character.  Events at Budennovsk, Kizlyar/Pervomaiskoe, 
and Moscow’s Nord-Ost Theater hold some common characteristics, but each is a clear 
example of greater asymmetry within this conflict. 
Recent Chechen terror is usually described as a consequence of liberal Russian air 
and artillery strikes.  Baev’s airpower assessment for the 1994 effort is a prime example: 
If the assumption was that a terrorized and demoralized population would 
deny support for resistance fighters, it failed to take into consideration 
such features of the Chechen national character as staunch dignity, pride in 
independence and tribal loyalty…  [The devastation wrought by air 
strikes] invariably produced outrage and determination to continue 
resistance.  Military aircraft had become a symbol of a cruel force that 
punished the innocent but missed the brave.  In fact, the indiscriminate 
bombings had made it possible—at least in the eyes of many Chechens—
to justify and even glorify such acts of terrorism as seizure of hostages in 
hospitals in Budennovsk in June 1995 and Kizlyar in January 1996.17 
Indirect fire of any sort, indiscriminate but highly destructive munitions fired by a 
usually invisible enemy, brought forth a logically asymmetric response from Chechen 
fighters.  When Shamil Basayev attacked the local police station and seized the hospital 
at Budennovsk in June of 1995, a standoff ensued and led to at least two botched attacks 
by the elite Russian Alpha counter-terrorism unit and a number of dead hostages.  The 
media was present and became a key factor in the event: 
The dramatic television pictures of women hostages screaming and 
waving sheets at the hospital windows had already been transmitted round 
the world and shaken the whole country.  It was an absolute public 
relations disaster for the government.  Suddenly Russian forces were seen 
as the brutal ones…  In an unprecedented step, [Prime Minister] 
Chernomyrdin  actually negotiated direct with Basayev over the phone.   
                                                 
17 Baev, “Russia’s Airpower…,” 7. 
8 
The atmosphere crackling with tension, the Russian prime minister 
allowed television cameras into his White House office to film his 
negotiations with Basayev… 18 
Eventually, the siege ran its course and after five days of negotiations, Basayev gained 
seven buses, approximately 100 hostages (which included government deputies and 
sixteen Russian journalists), and a refrigerator truck to carry the fourteen Chechen dead 
on a two-day trek back to Chechnya. 
The effects of Budennovsk were immediate on both sides of the fight.  Basayev, 
of course, became a Chechen national hero.  The aforementioned “absolute public 
relations disaster”19 had a similar profound effect on the Russian populace: 
The Russians, handed the proof that the Chechens were terrorists, should 
have been able to take the moral high ground for once.  Yet through their 
own incompetence and heavy-handedness they ended up the losers.  In the 
final analysis, as many people died in the Russian attempts to storm the 
hospital as in the Chechens’ original attack on the town.  Many in the 
country, while loathing the Chechens, blamed the government for 
allowing it to happen.  The raid was seen as a direct consequence of the 
war, and the law enforcement agencies were shown as incapable of 
protecting the population from terrorism.20 
If Budennovsk was ugly, the January 1996 hostage raid on Kizlyar and subsequent siege 
of Pervomaiskoe—both in the more Russia-friendly republic of Dagestan—emerged 
uglier for Russian government forces.  A Chechen insurgent leader, Salman Raduyev, led 
250 guerrillas on another bus trip to Pervomaiskoe, where the Russians reinforced their 
cordon around the city.  Subsequent attacks, led again by elite Alpha teams with 
coordinated rotary-wing, armor, and artillery support, proved unsuccessful: 
...the Russians pulled back their infantry and pulverized the city with 
firepower.  However, the Chechens had already exfiltrated through the 
Russian positions before the village  was  destroyed.   The  media  covered  
                                                 
18 Gaal and deWaal, 270-1. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 275. 
9 
the assault and reported the excessive military and civilian casualties, 
causing a general public condemnation of the Yeltsin government’s 
conduct of the war.21 
The Russian response to these acts, and to the later hostage situation at the Nord-Ost 
Theater in Moscow, followed a pattern: unexpected incidents beyond Chechnya’s 
borders, dead hostages, and international scrutiny via broadcast media.  One scholar has 
stated that “[t]he Chechen weapon that brought down the Russian giant is terrorism.”22 
After ten years, however, Russian forces are back in Chechnya prosecuting a war; 
so the aforementioned line of reasoning may be a bit premature.  Yeltsin’s advisor on 
Ethno-national Relations, Emil Pain, argues that after Budennovsk the Russian populace 
grew more supportive of government initiatives to send troops into the Caucasus.  The 
Kremlin needed little help to demonize Chechen insurgents, and Pain describes the 
emergence of “something akin to mass hatred for Chechen terrorism,” supported by 
consistent Literaturnaia Gazeta polls in late 1999 that made Basayev the most hated 
person amongst the Russian citizenry.23  When one considers further that it is this 
Russian citizenry that re-elected Yeltsin in the wake of Chechen terror attacks, it is hard 
to support the implication that the Chechens have emerged victorious by using terror in 
this battle of wills. 
One must also consider that the Chechen culture is well-suited to conduct both 
terror and asymmetric warfare.  Professors John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik describe 
this culture as “fiercely independent” and inform the reader that: 
It is part of their lore that they come together to fight for autonomy from 
empires.  The ways in which Chechen society revolved around kinship-
based relations were reinforced by a very deep sense of economic 
community, and an instinctive will to fight “infidels” inspired by Islamic 
culture...  [M]ost Chechens were included in either the Naqshabandiya or 
Qadiriyah tariqat, the Islamic orders that demand spiritual perfection from  
                                                 
21 Robert M. Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the 
Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2003), 46. 
22 Diane Lee Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya” (Graduate thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1999), 1. 
23 Pain, “The Second Chechen War: The Information Component,” Military Review, Vol. LXXX, No. 
4 (July-August 2000), 64. 
10 
their members.  These orders provided the ideological basis and 
organizational forms that inspired resistance to imperial Russian 
expansion for over three hundred years.24 
The network structure inherent in Chechen society as well as the ideological strength of 
Islam are ideal enablers for terror operations. 
The Russian response to Chechen terror is also pregnant with consequences that 
support the Chechen secessionist cause.  “Military force,” states one RAND study, “can 
result in friendly casualties and the death of innocent bystanders; it can create terrorist 
martyrs and provoke retaliation; it can alienate world public opinion and reduce 
international cooperation…”  Declaring war on terrorist leaders, this work further 
advises, “invites open-ended asymmetrical contests.”25 
D. NEOCORTICAL WARFARE 
These arguments regarding the under-funded Russian military—with its old 
equipment and lack of MOUT training, confronting an enemy that does not play by the 
rules of conventional warfare—are coherent, but not complete.  If one measures progress 
on the battlefield by tangible metrics like casualty counts and destroyed equipment, then 
these arguments carry some importance.  One could draw graphs and exclaim  “…over 
120 dead at the Nord-Ost Theater!” or “The company made it back from Grozny with 
only 20 percent of its tracked vehicles!” if so inclined.  When, however, one takes a 
diligent look at the conflict, there are other metrics to take into account.  As the U.S. 
tragically learned in Mogadishu, when fighting a low-tech swarm of insurgents on urban 
terrain, this sort of corporate boardroom mentality—one obsessed with numbers, 
technology, and inventories—does little to predict victory.  There is a less tangible 
variable that demands greater attention: 
Guerrilla war is not dependent for success on the efficient operation of 
complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the  
                                                 
24 John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, Vol. 22, (1999), 210. 
25 Brian Michael Jenkins, forward to Countering the New Terrorism, by Ian O. Lesser, et al.  (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), xii. 
11 
accuracy of electronic computers.  Its basic element is man, and man is 
more complex than any of his machines.  He is endowed with intelligence, 
emotion, and will (italics mine).26 
On July 15, 2004, retired Army Major General and former Commandant of the U.S. 
Army War College Robert Scales supported this viewpoint before the House Armed 
Services Committee when he asserted that, “The center of gravity in war is no longer the 
enemy’s army, it’s the enemy’s people.”27  If this intangible variable in the equation of 
conflict is “will”, how then can a combatant manipulate that variable’s value amongst 
both the enemy and his own troops? 
Theorist Richard Szafranski, in his work “Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of 
Skill,” asks this very question.  He posits that militaries emphasize the brain’s left 
hemisphere, “where the enemy is a system, an assemblage of production nodes controlled 
by an organic brain.  The campaign applies physical force to these nodes, as targets, using 
a presumed calculus that assesses effects on the whole system.”28  He then suggests 
employing the brain’s right hemisphere to enable viewing “conflict as warfare against 
minds and envisioning weapons as any means used to change the enemy’s will.”  The 
merging of these two hemispheric approaches produces a new mindset for fighting wars.  
“Neocortical Warfare is warfare that strives to control or shape the behavior of enemy 
organisms, but without destroying the organisms.  It does this by influencing, even to the 
point of regulating, the consciousness, perceptions and will of the adversary’s leadership: 
the enemy’s neocortical system (italics in original).”29 
Szafranski then mentions John Boyd’s famous OODA (observe, orient, decide, 
and act) loop paradigm, stating that the neocortical warfighter can disrupt his adversary’s  
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OODA loop and therefore retard its cyclic pattern while tightening his own loop.  The 
enemy’s mind becomes the Schwerpunkt—the targeted center of gravity—for the 
neocortical attack: 
[The protagonist seeks to influence] the adversary leaders’ perceptions of 
patterns and images, and shapes insights, imaginings and nightmares.  
This is all brought about without physical violence.  It is all designed to 
reorganize and redefine phenomenological designators to lead the enemy 
to choose not to fight.30 
To assail an enemy in this fashion demands effort, resources, and skill.  The protagonist 
must understand the adversary’s culture, perspectives and values; using this 
understanding he can influence and even manipulate the minds of both his own and the 
enemy’s troops. 
Russia’s method of warfare has not subdued Chechnya, but her troops have not 
been forced out of Chechnya either.  In fact, Russia’s left-brain dominant approach to 
warfare has been augmented since 1994 by attention to the softer, right-brain facets of 
combat.  Regarding the traditional left-brain approaches to warfare, Russian forces are 
better preparing the battlespace with intelligence and have improved their ability to 
communicate within that battlespace.  If this concept of Neocortical Warfare is applicable 
to Chechnya, evidence will show that Russian efforts in both Public Affairs and 
Psychological Operations have occurred since 1994 and are having concrete effects on 
the adversary’s consciousness, perceptions and will.  One can then make the case that in 
the near future Russian strategic thinkers will graft the two “brains” together and make 
the leap to the neocortical paradigm.  
 This thesis will attempt to verify the following matrix regarding attention to the 
aforementioned ‘softer’ facets of warfare: 





Case IPB PA PSYOP Battlefield Comms 
1994 Limited Limited Limited Limited 
1999 Improved Improved Improved Improved 
Table 1. Matrix. 
 
The results of this attempt will reveal whether the Neocortical Warfare paradigm is 
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II. 1994 INVASION 
 
In reviewing the events of 11 December 1994, one can surmise that the Russians 
were riding the left hemisphere into catastrophe. Some preliminary, scattered bombing 
occurred in Grozny before tanks entered the city.  The Russian parliamentarian Anatoly 
Shabad, who celebrated the first day of 1995 in Grozny, suggests that, like Prague in 
1968 or Moscow in 1991, Russian commanders believed that tanks would “go and park 
in the town, and that way create political pressure so the government would not be able to 
survive any longer.”31 
Russian troops entering the capital were suffering from all the symptoms of the 
aforementioned erosion in military capability—“underpaid, poorly equipped, poorly 
clothed, and uninformed about the purpose and goals of the operation.”32  Three separate 
armored spearheads rolled toward the capital, confident of victory.  The plan was to take 
the railway and broadcast stations, as well as the presidential palace.  This blueprint 
eerily resembled the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; the template was used as 
successfully in Afghanistan in 1979. 
 The series of events that led to the committal of Russian troops is disheartening.  
The Kremlin wanted to invade Chechnya and kept its consultation with the military to a 
minimum.  Defense Minister Grachev, once given the warning order, threw himself into 
making it happen but failed to adequately prepare his soldiers for the task.  “There was no 
apparent concept of operations behind the incursion beyond a vaguely defined injunction 
to disarm illegal formations and to lend fire support to MVD troops.”33 
The invasion’s initial history is well documented.  Chechen guerrillas allowed 
these heavy Russian columns to advance toward objectives and then initiated ambushes 
with  snipers  and  rocket-propelled  grenades  (RPG).  The cooperation between Russian  
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infantry and armored vehicles was abysmal.  Entire units were wiped out as Chechen 
fighters took generations of revenge culture and lessons learned fighting in forests and 
adapted these to the urban battlefield. 
Appendix J: Lessons Learned from Russian Military Operations in Chechnya 
1994-1996 in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3 Military Operations on 
Urban Terrain (MOUT) holds some disturbing statistics for the left-brain analysis.  The 
ratio of lost armored vehicles to the total is 105:120 in the initial attack on Grozny; the 
Chechen anti-tank teams were thus batting about .875.  The Chechen success curve 
dropped to about .700 soon after New Years’ Eve, but this lapse in performance may 
have been eclipsed when the guerrillas expunged approximately 1000 soldiers from the 
Russian 131st Maikop Brigade at Grozny’s central railway station.  This brigade ceased to 
exist, and later interviews with survivors offer some clues as to why: 
Survivors… said they had no idea they were driving towards such a big 
battle.  Their orders were vague and unrealistic…  [T]hey were ordered to 
go into the city ‘without arms, and no shooting’.34 
Russian commanders failed to arm their troops with pertinent information or guidance; 
the adversary showed no such shortcomings: 
…Chechens had been preparing for the battle of Grozny for at least 3-4 
months before Russian troops entered the city.  During this time they 
developed war plans, divided up zones of responsibility, trained their 
militia, and set up effective communications.  In fact, they were putting 
into practice all the things that Soviet analysts had identified as key 
lessons of World War II…  The rebels were well-trained and drilled, many 
of them veterans of the Soviet military who had apparently retained more 
of their training than had many of their Russian counterparts…  [T]he 
rebel soldiers knew their city well…  Closely set buildings and a network 
of underground passages enabled them to change position unseen by the 
Russians (italics mine).35 
By the end of February the Russians had capitalized on their previously-mentioned 
artillery and air superiority and drove the Chechens from the capital.  In August 1996 the 
insurgents attacked and took Grozny back, a victory that eventually brought negotiations 
and Russian withdrawal. 
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 By the time Russia brought her troops home in 1996, Western sources calculated 
that 20-30,000 had died on both sides of the conflict;36 all of which were technically 
citizens of Russia.  Moscow’s treasury had doled out “upward of $5 billion in direct 
operating expenses, not counting the additional costs of aircraft and vehicles lost or 
damaged…  Ministry of Defense arrears in wages and debts to suppliers now total over 
$2 billion.”37  The effects of this operation on Russian society and economy beyond these 
numbers would be difficult to calculate. 
 Envision the blindfolded man lurching toward a piñata, swinging away with a 
sledgehammer.  A closer look reveals this unfortunate man’s emaciated physique, the 
result of a few years of malnourishment and relative inactivity.  His hammer is chipped 
and scratched, but still functional.  While his colleagues have not spun him around and 
disoriented him, they have pointed him in roughly the right direction and kicked him in 
the seat of his pants.  These colleagues know also that if he is successful in smashing the 
piñata, he’ll wander around disoriented and later clean up the mess after the goodies have 
been harvested. 
As the conflict in Chechnya developed, however, the perception of both the 
contest and the Grozny piñata had changed; the metaphorical protagonist, however, 
doggedly kept swinging away at a target that was mobile and did not play by the rules. 
A. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (IPB) 
IPB is a tool commanders employ “to decipher the effects of the terrain, weather, 
and threat in order to predict how the enemy will act to help the commander select the 
best course of action for the friendly unit.”38  Doing so, while protecting one’s own 
capabilities from enemy analysis, gains what the U.S. military calls “information 
operations”.  Filtering, fusing, and filing this information into a useful product helps 
military leadership to gain “decision superiority”.  The product of this is “intelligence”.39   
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 The Red Army had focused since the Second World War on its tanks charging 
through the Fulda Gap to assail NATO.  The envisioned tank-on-tank war of destruction 
on the plains of Central Europe, however, was quite different from taking down a modern 
city.  One would surmise that one of two Cold War superpowers would have little trouble 
subduing one of its secessionist republics, especially given the relative ground, air, 
missile, and electronic orders of battle.  Russia still held both space-based and air-
breathing reconnaissance platforms—though, again, the post-1989 erosion of military 
capability applies.  A quick left-brain analysis would conclude that the culture, which 
blasted the word sputnik into the American vernacular, could easily monitor the activities 
of rebellious tribal guerrillas. 
 High-tech, however, does not translate into high situational awareness in the 
urban battlespace: 
Buildings and infrastructure tend to degrade the capability of imaging and 
communication equipment.  Urban infrastructure, including electricity, 
media, satellites, and other resources, increase the capabilities and 
numbers of people producing, sharing, and receiving information via 
television, Internet, telecommunications, and radio.  The masses of people 
in an urban area simultaneously provide more sources of information in 
the form of HUMINT (human intelligence) and act to overwhelm the 
collection and analysis that all-source intelligence can provide.  The sheer 
density and diversity of all features of an urban area—buildings, 
infrastructure, people—flood extant technologies in ways that often make 
information superiority unreachable.40 
This assessment assumes that the protagonist is interested in preparing the battlespace 
before pumping blood and treasure into it.  In the neocortical context, “We cannot hope 
to influence or condition what we do not understand.”41 
 Indeed, reconnaissance aircraft and satellites were not the only legacies of the 
Soviet power structure.  Former dissident Sergei Kovalyov describes the 1994 incursion 
as: 
…a purely Soviet chain of events in which the most important thing was 
not to make the best decision, but to ensure that the boss was always right: 
‘It is a law of Soviet politics.  Not a single adviser in the Soviet system 
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can allow himself to say something different from what the boss wants to 
hear.  That means he falls out of the system, he is not playing by the 
rules…  Of course a nomenklatura politician, if he is dealing with the 
Chechen issue, of course he thinks about solving it, but the main thing for 
him is not that problem at all.  The main thing is to coincide with the 
opinion of the boss.’42 
One therefore wonders if—even if it had performed to its potential—the Yeltsin 
government would have listened to its intelligence apparatus’s objective assessments.  In 
order for this system to reach that potential, though, it would have to have been organized 
and tasked in some efficient manner.  The President’s irrational response to November’s 
failed black operation to unseat Dudayev provided little time or incentive, however, to 
emphasize efficiency in planning.  Only after the true strength of the Chechen adversary 
was revealed in reports of twisted, blackened Russian equipment and smoking corpses, 
did the government begin to worry about which of its ministries was responsible for IPB. 
The Defense Ministry held only limited capability to collect intelligence inside 
Russian territory, so the counter-intelligence arm, the FSK (successor to the KGB’s 
domestic directorate) was charged to do so. The Ministry of the Interior (MVD), 
meanwhile, had little reconnaissance capability, so it chose a more reactive rather than 
proactive approach to IPB—it appeared that the MVD’s method was to compile Chechen 
order of battle by exposing its own troops to fire.43  While a huge waste of blood and 
treasure, this method was more reliable than principle FSK sources.  “The FSK’s 
information was undoubtedly fatally flawed since its main source was the self-serving 
anti-Dudayev opposition (within Chechnya).”44 
 If the failure of Russian intelligence services to assess the adversary’s strength is 
(at its most benevolent assessment) due to bureaucratic confusion, its failure to orient its 
troops to Chechnya’s terrain was criminally negligent.  Tsarist military engineers had laid 
Grozny’s cornerstone, after all, and Soviet city planners had surveyed and built its 
infrastructure.  One could therefore expect military leadership to provide an accurate map 
of the city for Russian invasion forces in 1994, and in numbers that would facilitate 
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navigation, delineation of unit boundaries, and fire support for units down to company 
level.  “Their maps were outdated and tended to be out of scale.  On the other hand, the 
Chechens emphasized detailed reconnaissance and updated maps as part of their 
doctrine.”45   
 Chechen IPB was certainly more thorough in most ways.  A 1999 interview with 
Aslan Maskhadov reveals a particular diligence in the 1996 Chechen offensive: 
I had been planning this operation for 6 months, as we always believed 
that the war would end with the recapture of Grozny.  I thought about it 
constantly, even to the point of conducting radio rehearsals to provoke a 
Russian reaction.  I had studied the maps, the Russian positions, the 
approaches, the routes of advance; I had everything ready.  We held 
meetings with our commanders who gave us their intelligence reports.  We 
had reconnoitered every inch, we knew the disposition of every Russian 
position, the numbers, the roadblocks, everything.”46 
Tourpal Ali-Kaimov, another Chechen leader, elaborates further: 
[O]ur normal routine included a map reconnaissance, followed by a foot 
reconnaissance and then bringing the reconnaissance asset back to 
headquarters with his map.  Chechen scouts briefed commanders and 
planners personally.  Whenever possible, we ordered another 
reconnaissance mission to confirm the results of the first…  Traditional 
reconnaissance methods were augmented by human intelligence and 
reconnaissance performed by elders, women, and children.  Virtually 
every Chechen was an intelligence collector [and were] provided Motorola 
radios to enable timely reporting…  The Russians did not possess the same 
quality or quantity of maps, nor did they conduct effective reconnaissance 
of the city to verify or validate the maps they did possess.47  
These interviews go on to mention a robust HUMINT network, often using females, 
traders at marketplaces, and captured soldiers from large Russian garrisons to better 
understand Russian bases, personnel, arms, stockpiles, and morale. 
 Clearly, in 1994, the Chechens held the advantage in IPB.  A prime example of 
this lay in the Russian leadership’s “mirror imaging” in analysis of Chechen planning for 
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the defense of Grozny.  In fact, one can envision that leadership spreading one of their 
inadequate city maps on a big table, circling objectives with a marker, and then 
discussing the way to defend those objectives in order to develop possible Chechen 
courses of action.  This practice is understandable if one is fighting a tabletop exercise.  
Somewhere along the way, however, this process diverged from reality—where one 
reviews data from collection platforms to determine enemy dispositions and possible 
courses of action—to a role-playing game where someone decided the Chechens would 
defend their capital against an armored attack much like the Soviets defended Kursk 
against the Wehrmacht.  No one appeared to recognize the hazards of predicting a vastly 
different adversary’s intent and possible responses via a fifty-year-old template—and the 
plan to take Grozny emerged accordingly: 
Russian intelligence estimates established that the Chechen command had 
created three defensive rings to defend Grozny: an inner circle around the 
Presidential Palace; a middle circle up to five kilometers from the Palace 
and an outer circle that passed mainly through the city outskirts.  The 
middle and outer defense rings were fortified strongpoints, while the inner 
line consisted of prepared positions from which to deliver direct artillery 
and tank fire.48 
The Chechens, of course, were not going to cooperate.  If, for example, they did 
occupy a position it was temporary and was sited either in a basement or a building’s 
upper floor in order to counter the elevation limitations in Russian main tank guns.  The 
temporary nature of these positions was a facet of what Russian forces did encounter—
the Chechen “defensive defense,” one that emphasized the mobile and elusive qualities of 
Chechen urban tactics.  “By the time the Russians brought the necessary firepower 
forward to reduce the strongpoint, the Chechens would have already abandoned the 
position, further frustrating the Russians.”49  This frustration, of course, bred impatience, 
inspiring Russian ground units to charge headlong into the city center, where the 
Chechens could ambush their armored columns in conditions where RPGs and snipers 
held the advantage. 
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 This disturbing and pervasive desire to use what had worked in the past, however, 
may have also seemed helpful when the Russian government began dealing with the 
media in the wake of this ill-fated invasion. 
B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) 
“…Russia’s invasion of Chechnya in December 1994 showed a far more 
advanced state of organizational decomposition and disarray than previously realized.”50 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the event was facilitated by 
Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, in which he called for “’publicity’ of information, about 
the ills afflicting the system, for only such ‘openness’ could counteract ‘bureaucratic 
distortions’ and unleash the creative intelligence of the population.”51  This “publicity” 
opened the barn door and all the mutant animals of the system ran out into the corral; the 
Soviet farm’s shareholders ended up tearing the farm down to build a new one.  The 
Yeltsin government, therefore, should have been aware of the importance of managing 
the media conduit; the average Russian could now turn on the television and see his 
government’s shortcomings—including the product of the aforementioned mirror 
imaging in Grozny.  Governments are created and maintained because there are certain 
responsibilities that only governments can carry out.  Securing media support for the 
execution of these responsibilities is imperative: 
Any government worthy of its name has to do what it thinks necessary for 
the good of the country, but its course can be greatly eased if it has public 
opinion on its side.  Decision making demands a knowledge of how the 
people are thinking and feeling—and why.52 
There seemed to be little attention paid to getting the Russian public solidly behind the 
Chechnya intervention.  Perhaps the Yeltsin government figured that simply repeating 
characterizations of Dudayev’s administration like Aleksandr Rutskoi’s of October 
1994—“This is not democracy, it is banditry.”53—would suffice. 
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 When Russian forces entered Chechnya a short time after Rutskoi made this 
remark, both Russian and international journalists were given outlandish freedom to roam 
and record the operation’s progress.  The Chechens took full advantage of this marvelous 
media bonanza.  Anecdotes of insurgents risking their lives to bring journalists to the 
action are common,54 but this was only a standard tactic in the overall operation to 
broadcast their perspective to the world: 
The rebels were very open to press interest, granting interviews and 
generally making themselves available to domestic and foreign journalists.  
But they were not averse to more creative approaches.  For instance, the 
few tanks the rebels had were dug into multistory buildings in the center 
of the city.  When the Chechens fired from these positions, Russian 
returned fire inevitably hit civilian housing, schools, hospitals, and day 
care centers.  When the cameras recorded and sent these images home, the 
Russians looked especially heartless, and the Chechens appeared even 
more the victims.55 
The Chechens also remembered Afghanistan and its role in fracturing the politburo’s 
credibility vis-à-vis its own populace.  State newspapers like Pravda had repeatedly 
shown happy Afghan children receiving new schools from smiling Soviet paratroops.  
Meanwhile these soldiers came home and each—whether silently from a sealed coffin or 
angrily from behind a bottle—had imparted the ugly truths of that conflict to his fellow 
Soviet citizens.  Chechen insurgents—some of which had fought for the Red Army in 
Afghanistan—therefore knew the potency of media manipulation and its role in taking 
down a superpower. 
When the Russians secretly accompanied opposition forces into Grozny in 
November 1994, not only did Dudayev’s forces soundly defeat this effort (these loyalist 
fighters, it emerged, would rather loot Grozny shops than carry out the intended coup), 
but proved Russian participation and exposed false claims in Russian state-run media: 
[O]ne of the captured Russian soldiers told his story to reporters under the 
watchful eye of his Chechen captors in the basement of the State Security 
building.  Andrei Chasov, twenty-one, a small, frightened, sandy-haired 
boy, said he was a conscript who had served seven months in the 
Kantemirov Tank Division outside Moscow.  Two days before the attack 
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he was sent down to Mozdok and told only that they were being sent to 
control a demonstration.  ‘They told us nothing, they do everything in 
secret,’ he said.  When they reached the edge of town his comrades fled 
and Chasov was captured, still having only a vague idea where he was…  
The debacle was made worse by the official Russian news agency Itar-
Tass and the First Channel of Russian television, which had been primed 
to release news of the attack.  They flashed up the news that the fight had 
reached the Presidential Palace and Dudayev was fleeing, then they were 
forced to make a humiliating retraction.56 
This passage reveals at least two flaws in the Russian approach to Public Affairs, one a 
symptom of recent democratization and a second the residue of totalitarianism.  Granting 
journalists unimpeded access to the Chechen opposition and the insurgency’s message, 
while good for basic freedom in a democratic state, served up the initiative to Yeltsin’s 
clever adversaries in Grozny.  Losing this initiative in the chaos of conflict is a danger 
that contemporary analysts have mentioned repeatedly: 
Potentially, the impact of any event can be raised to the strategic level of 
war.  The “strategic corporal” may be interviewed or filmed by media in 
the area.  Collateral damage or civilian casualties are often fodder for 
sensationalized news that can enrage both local and international 
audiences.57 
The discrepancy between the state-controlled press message and reality proved 
harmful, though it is difficult to shed habits derived from 70 years of tight control.  One 
cannot help but think of that system’s efforts to distill the news for its population’s 
consumption via the Soviet Department of Agitation and Propaganda. 
In the age of the internet and the digital camera, however, restrictive totalitarian 
models have proven themselves inadequate: 
News reporters are present on the battlefield in greater numbers than ever 
before…  [B]ecause of the proliferation of smaller, more portable media 
devices, information technology is altering the political landscape of the 
battlefield.  Violence must be applied in a more discriminate manner 
because even the most minor acts of violence can be broadcast to millions 
of  voters.   The  more  people  with  portable  commercial  equipment, the  
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greater the chance that battlefield drama will be recorded…  Today, 
uncensored information can be provided to the public in near-real-time, 
video form.58 
The Chechen insurgency was obviously aware of both the advance of technology and the 
“strategic corporal” concept, where a lone deployed soldier at the tactical level can affect 
national strategy via the presence of journalists.  The Chechens thus used captured 
Russian soldiers like Andrei Chasov to their advantage.  Their use of Grozny 
noncombatants for cover, concealment, and support, however, enabled even greater gains 
vis-à-vis the media.  The “indiscriminate killing of civilians provides a moral and 
psychological advantage to the enemy, erodes domestic and international support for the 
use of force, and strengthens the will to resist among the indigenous population,”59 and 
the Russians certainly provided this stimulus. 
One would expect augmented efforts to restrain both the media via access controls 
and the military via clear and concise rules of engagement.  When Russian forces decided 
to minimize friendly casualties by greater emphasis on bombing and shelling, closing the 
barn door on media access meant little.  By December 1995, analyst Andrei Raevsky was 
already writing in an international journal that “gross violations of human rights 
committed by Russian security and armed forces in Chechnya… have been widely 
reported.”60  Again, ugly animals were soon roaming about the corral in front of the 
international audience. 
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
If Russian efforts to enhance support from their own population via the media 
bordered on negligence, actions to win Chechen noncombatants over were downright 
laughable. 
 The Soviet Union held plenty of experience in Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP), but the bulk of this lay in its sponsorship of insurgents during the twentieth 
century.  One scholar describes this sponsorship as: 
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a vital instrument in Ho/Mao-type wars of national liberation, especially 
the early stages where revolutions are hatched from grievances of the 
masses by communist incubation and kept at the right emotional 
temperature by thousands of native agitators.  Without this skillful and 
massive agitprop and organizational effort, which has been characterized 
as “half the revolutionary task,” there could be no successful liberation 
wars…  PSYOP use, however, must be carefully calculated in policy and 
operations to reach the grassroots level.  Whoever gets to the people first, 
with ideas that stimulate self-interest, gains a decisive lead…61 
The conflict in the Caucasus, while dormant during the Soviet period, had been alive for 
centuries.  In their interaction with a tribal society and its rich oral tradition, the Russians 
may have lost the grassroots Chechen populace the first time the 19th century Tsarist 
general Ermolov opened his mouth. 
 There was, however, opportunity in Chechnya for a concerted PSYOP effort 
against the Dudayev regime.  By January 1994, write Gaal and deWaal, there was gunfire 
in the streets of Grozny and its citizens were huddled around gas rings on stoves to 
maintain warmth.  Black marketers were growing astronomically rich, while unpaid 
public service employees like doctors and teachers sat at desks in overcoats because the 
government could not provide heat to their institutions.  Public dissent was silent under 
Dudayev, but it existed, according to the imam of central Grozny’s mosque, who 
estimated that two-thirds of Chechnya’s population opposed their government and its 
leader.  “[Dudayev] has done nothing for the republic,” said the imam, who went on to 
lament the erosion of public respect for mullahs and the lack of a proactive construction 
program for public needs.  Under the Dudayev regime, it appeared, the rich were getting 
richer while the government failed to build mosques, schools, or hospitals.62 
Russian leaflet drops, blaring loudspeakers, and interference with Chechen radio 
broadcasts were employed,63 but seemed to accomplish little in the face of indigenous 
resolve to seek independence.  A look at the individual leaflets may help elucidate the 
reason: 
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They were in turns threatening and condescending.  ‘Come to your senses!  
You are protecting not sovereignty and freedom, but the money of 
Dudayev… that he stole from the people,’ one read.  Another, headed 
‘Ultimatum’, warned: ‘Any provocation against the Russian forces will 
rapidly be met with all the might of Russian firepower!  Those caught with 
weapons will be annihilated!’64 
Chechen families who simply wanted to be left alone thus had to choose between the 
Russian Scylla and Chechen Charybdis—neither of which promised security or 
prosperity. 
 Classic Russian authors like Pushkin and Lermontov had depicted a Caucasus full 
of bandits and cutthroats, a region perilous to the Russian visitor even almost two 
hundred years ago.  The precedent had thus been set when the “White Book” emerged to 
elucidate crimes against Chechnya’s Russian population under Dudayev: 
It is a depressing catalogue of muggings, kidnaps and murders but it is an 
insidious document because it misleadingly presents the crimes as having 
been a deliberately targeted anti-Russian policy by the Dudayev 
government.  The White Book was handed out to Russian soldiers during 
the war.  Almost all the incidents in the book probably occurred, but its 
unbalanced focus on the sufferings of Russians as an ethnic group 
consolidated the image of ‘cut-throat Chechens’ and helped to legitimize 
atrocities by those same soldiers against the local Chechen population.65 
This is, again, part of a long tradition in Soviet PSYOP.  Author Lev Yudovich, in 
his article “Indoctrination of Hate,” says that Soviet military doctrine cultivated hatred in 
its troops for three reasons: to inspire a belief in victory, to prepare soldiers to act in 
dangerous situations, and to psychologically prepare them for the rigors of modern 
warfare.  He cites a passage from a contemporary Soviet scholar to support this 
conclusion.  If one mentally substitutes the word “Chechen” for “Enemy”, he can again 
perceive the residue of Cold War doctrine and derive the reason the average Chechen 
could more easily support Dudayev: 
In case of war, the Soviet soldier will face a strong and brutal enemy who 
has been well indoctrinated in a spirit of irreconcilability toward the 
Soviet people.  The Soviet soldier must therefore have a clearly defined 
attitude for the enemy: hate, contempt, and a feeling of superiority over 
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them.  We must show the soldier the strong and weak points of our 
enemies.  We have to define the enemy in terms of his psychological 
characteristics (or stereotypes) that are related to his nationality or ethnic 
group.66 
The “White Book” certainly served this aim, but one wonders how much effort was really 
made to indoctrinate these soldiers as they were charging into Grozny in 1994 with no 
real comprehension of their goals or whereabouts. 
 Evidence of this failure to psychologically prepare troops is best drawn from the 
reports of Russian military doctors.  One study of 1,312 Russian soldiers in the conflict 
showed an alarming psychological illness rate of 72 percent.  Breaking this number down 
further, 46 percent displayed depression, lethargy, insomnia, hypochondria, or panic 
attacks; the other 26 percent included psychotic reactions, “deterioration of moral values 
or interpersonal relations, excitement or acute depression.”67   
 The Chechens, conversely, excelled in preparing their fighters for the hazards of 
conflict.  Beyond the tribal and ethnic loyalties, past the unifying force of Islamic 
religion, the majority of the Chechen population (and a good portion of the Russian 
inhabitants) oriented their ire toward the invader after losing homes and loved ones to 
indiscriminate Russian firepower. 
While Dudayev’s lieutenants also employed leaflets before operations in order to 
both incite surrender in Russian soldiers and evacuation in civilians68, their “dirty tricks” 
were more effective in the urban battleground.  This toolkit included the Chechen 
snipers’ practice of aiming for the legs and subsequently shooting Russian rescue parties.  
Booby-trapping dead and wounded Russian soldiers was common.  Masquerading as 
workers from nongovernmental organizations or civilian noncombatants in order to guide  
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Russian units into ambushes also brought some success.  These practices surely 
contributed to the aforementioned malaise and “deterioration of moral values” in the 
Russian ranks. 
 These three factors—mixed messages to the average Chechen citizen, a slipshod 
(but vitriolic, if one was lucky enough to receive a copy of the “White Book”) effort to 
psychologically prepare Russian soldiers for the rigors of combat, and brutal Chechen 
practices on the streets of Grozny—facilitated atrocities in the form of the “zachistka”.  
This word, used to describe diligent search operations in villages for guerrillas and their 
arms caches, literally means “cleansing”.  “It has become synonymous,” write Gaal and 
deWaal, “with looting, violence and mass detentions of the male population.”69  One 
such infamous operation on 6-8 April 1995 in Samashki by the Interior Ministry’s 
(MVD) Sofrinskaya Brigade was particularly noteworthy. 
After Russian units delivered yet another ultimatum to the village and were 
rebuffed, the soldiers pulled back and slammed it with an artillery barrage.  When this 
was lifted, armored personnel carriers moved in, MVD troops dismounted, and over 100 
people were driven out of their burning homes to be shot in the street.  The Interior 
Ministry, confronted with reports of 200 destroyed homes and 100 men dragged away to 
the infamous filtration camps (where they were held without charge; many disappeared in 
these facilities), claimed the dead were all Chechen insurgents: 
The military log also only registers the killing of ‘fighters’.  But the men 
on the ground, shaken and angered by their losses, were just taking it out 
on anyone they found.  There was revenge in the air for those comrades 
who had been killed, according to [one of the senior Russian participants].  
‘They brought back one APC that was burnt.  The men inside were just 
cinders and pieces of bones,’ he said, still angry nearly two years later.  He 
expressed no remorse, just bitterness that the brigade received so much 
flak for carrying out orders.  As he was leaving, he confided, ‘It was better 
in Soviet times, then we just did our job and there was no talk about 
civilians.’70 
This brutal tit-for-tat state of affairs became commonplace as Chechen fighters 
refused to either follow Russian directives or play by the rules (booby-trapping and 
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mutilating corpses or torturing prisoners to death, for example), Russian troops 
subsequently lived in a state of edginess, and unaffiliated civilians ended up the losers 
when some event sparked a firefight.  Inevitably, in the course of these events, Russian 
commanders would tire of losing people in the town and would pull them out.  The 
insurgents would see this occur and evacuate the village, so that only the nonaligned 
would remain in their homes and receive whatever occurred when frustrated Russian 
troops reappeared.  Dudayev’s minions ensured that these events received maximum 
publicity both within and without Chechen territory; eventually everyone in the 
Chechnya area of operations ended up taking a side in the conflict. 
The Russian government lost the PSYOP battle when it entered this repeated 
cycle of violence against the people it was allegedly there to save.  A combination of 
heavy-handed Russian messages and Dudayev’s media manipulation thus exacerbated a 
complicated state of affairs. 
D. BATTLEFIELD COMMUNICATIONS 
Russian commanders also needed to convey messages to their units.  The nuts-
and-bolts aspects of modern battlefield communications as well as the transmission of 
lessons learned in combat demand scrutiny within the scope of this study. 
 In nearly every evaluation of the 1994 invasion, authors mention the Russian 
habit of broadcasting in the clear.  Common communication security procedures such as 
cryptography employment and pre-scheduled frequency changes were often laid aside in 
the effort to remove some of the aforementioned confusion within and amongst Russian 
combat formations. 
 As in nearly every Cold War conflict, walking around a combat zone under a 
large, thirty-year-old antenna brought more than the usual danger to a combatant; the 
Chechens targeted and killed a large number of radiotelephone operators.  There is 
evidence that this peril grew even greater if one’s specialty was fire support coordination: 
Rebel forces made a special effort to hunt down Russian forward air 
controllers (avianavodchiki), of which some 40 had been attached to the 
ground forces.  In one example cited, no sooner had a FAC gone on the air 
near Chechen-Aul than massive shelling commenced on his position.  The  
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rebels did good work triangulating his location until a Russian motorized 
infantry unit finally pinpointed and seized the offending direction finding 
equipment.71 
The resourceful Chechens were, of course, intercepting this radio traffic, a practice that 
presented opportunities for both passive and active exploitation measures.  Several 
scholars have cited cases of Chechen fighters deceiving Russian pilots into bombing 
Russian forces72 and calling in fire missions to Russian artillery batteries.73  There are 
also accounts of Chechen commanders exploiting these transmissions in order to make 
their own tactical decisions.74 
At the siege of Pervomaiskoye in January 1996, an officer from the elite Alpha 
counterterrorism unit recounted to Gall and deWaal that “‘They (the Chechens) knew 
what units were moving in to fight, and when and where there would be artillery 
strikes.’”  Russian forces, according to this account were also assailed by their own 
artillery and helicopters,75 a development doubtless facilitated by the fact that Russian 
“communications were so basic that units could often only talk to their base command 
and not to other groups around them.”76  To elaborate, Russian equipment and procedures 
(especially with formations cobbled together from interspersed Ministry of Defense and 
MVD assets) were so incompatible that “intelligence frequently could not be shared, and 
units were unable to transmit their locations to supporting air forces.”77  Indeed, their 
opportunities to resolve these issues were constrained by the urban conditions 
exemplified in Grozny.  “There are only a few FM frequencies, most in the lower bands, 
that work in cities; thus both sides will be trying to use the same part of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.”78 
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The Chechens thus knew both exactly where to mine necessary information on the 
electromagnetic spectrum and how to employ it to sow confusion in the ranks of their 
enemies.  “One such method was to use the seams between the Russian units, coupled 
with the poor coordination between Russian units, to provoke the Russian elements to fire 
at each other…  Often enough, they kept firing at each other until sunrise the next 
morning when helicopters providing assistance could observe and clarify the situation.”79 
Chechen battlefield communications revealed greater efficiency and attention to 
operational security: 
For their own communications, hand-held Motorola and Nokia radios 
were sufficient, and simply speaking in their native language was enough 
to keep communications secure given the dearth of Chechen-speaking 
Russians.  The Chechens’ security was also enhanced by careful control of 
information, which was disseminated strictly on a need-to-know basis.80 
Russian communication systems and security measures left much to be desired when one 
scrutinizes the adversary’s methods to achieve the same ends.  Each seven- or eight-man 
Chechen team, according to one article, used one of the aforementioned Motorola walkie-
talkies, which “were much more technologically advanced than anything the Russians 
had.”81  These radios, however, did not represent the only example of Chechens 
communicating via commercial off-the-shelf technology (COTS). 
…Chechens were very innovative in their use of ham radio contacts and 
television feeds to relay information to combatants and civilians alike.  
These older information technologies were useful in informing Chechens 
of general news events, and helping families and relatives to stay in touch.  
They kept Chechen fighters and civilians informed about where travel was 
dangerous.  And, during periods of intense fighting, Chechen commanders 
used ham radios and cell phones extensively to issue orders and maintain 
overall command and control of their widely scattered forces.82 
The tribal nature of Chechen society, galvanized by a common religion and drive 
to eject Russian power from within its borders, also facilitated communication.  When 
one considers that “almost 100 percent of Chechen adult males were conscripted into 
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military service”83 under the Soviet regime, one can see that a technical and tactical 
knowledge base was available when Russian forces invaded.  The previously mentioned 
Chechen oral tradition enabled transmission of what the U.S. military calls after-action 
reports (AAR) and the passing of lessons learned amongst guerrilla units. 
 Arquilla and Karasik assert that “Chechen small unit cohesion during the war 
benefited greatly from the fact that fighters were almost always serving in combat with 
their kinsmen… [and] a particular clan would always have units in action.”84  These 
fighters would “commute” back and forth to battle: 
[When home, however,] they would share, through story-telling sessions, 
their latest experiences with other units of the taip [clan structure], 
offering advice about how to fight the Russians, as well as technical tips 
[to modify and upgrade basic military equipment]…  [T]here is also much 
evidence that, confronted by a dire Russian threat, a good bit of inter-clan 
information transfer went on as well.  This was very important because, 
overall across clans, Chechen men had important insights to offer each 
other—based on combat experiences in Abkhazia, Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia.85 
Afghanistan permeates all pertinent literature on this conflict, especially in the 
context of organizational evolution; it is like an unpleasant meal that the Russian military 
continued to burp up throughout the 1994-96 hostilities.  General Aleksandr Lebed, a 
traditionally influential and acerbic voice in Yeltsin’s military, said in the midst of this 
that, “Step by step the Afghan war experience is being repeated in Chechnya.”  He 
opined to his colleagues that “We risk getting involved in a war with the entire Muslim 
world.  Individual guerrillas will indefinitely shoot at our tanks and pick off our soldiers 
with single bullets.”86 
The reason for this institutional inertia is at least indirectly attributable to the 
Russian incapability to share lessons learned in combat amongst its own formations; the 
last Russian units had left Kabul, after all, only five years before.  In two years of 
combat, the Russians lost 6,000 in Chechnya; in ten years of fighting the Afghan 
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mujahidin, the number was 14,000.87  If the Russians had continued to fight another eight 
years in Chechnya without an effort to learn from their experiences, a left-brain 
assessment would thus put losses somewhere near 30,000.  Looking at this estimate, one 
can speculate that the human costs of attaining victory in this particular war would be 
astronomical. 
Russia certainly lost the information war in the first Chechen conflict.  
Intelligence collection was sloppy and dissemination to troops at the front—from 
whichever ministry—was hardly efficient.  Journalists, meanwhile, ran rampant 
throughout the battlespace and the Chechens were better at manipulating these 
messengers in order to promote the secessionist cause.  The clumsy Russian PSYOP 
effort incited scared and demoralized troops to drop fire on noncombatants.  Meanwhile, 
faulty equipment and procedures in Russian battlefield communications brought further 
advantage to the adversary. 
The Russian military, however, has shown a historical adaptability in such periods 
of crisis—for example in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40.  In such conflicts, Russian 
forces took full advantage of a break in the fighting to improve and maximize advantage 
in subsequent engagements.  The interval between 1996 and the second invasion in 1999 














                                                 
87 Cassidy, 48. 
35 
III. 1999 INVASION 
 
In April 1996, Russian communications specialists had pinpointed Chechen 
President Dudayev’s location when he turned on his satellite phone.  Russian strike 
aircraft then killed him with a precision-guided munition.  This high-tech operation 
revealed two important characteristics of this conflict.  First, the Russians were still 
competitive in their use of leading-edge technology and information to achieve military 
goals.  The time period between Dudayev switching on his phone to the moment the 
orbiting pilot released a munition was short enough to enable success.  One scholar has 
described this information-targeting loop in Kosovo thusly: “Hitting the right target on 
time requires sorting out the right coordinates from a pile of information (interpreted 
correctly) at the right time, a degree of data management that is difficult to achieve.”88  
This was certainly true for the success in hunting down Dudayev. 
Secondly, Dudayev’s death did not end or even erode the insurgents’ will to 
continue hostilities.  In less than five months’ time, the Chechens launched an offensive 
into Grozny, killed another 2,100 Russian soldiers, and “broke the political will of the 
Russian government to continue the fighting.”89 
In August 1996, Dudayev’s successor Maskhadov met with General Aleksandr 
Lebed in Dagestan and hammered out “Joint Relations between the Russian Federation 
and the Chechen Republic”.  The so-called Khasavyurt Agreement brought a ceasefire 
and negotiated Russian withdrawal; the two sides would have five years to decide 
Chechnya’s relationship to Russia.  “It was full,” write Gall and deWaal, “of lofty ideals 
about protecting human rights, the right to self-determination, and the rights of ethnic 
minorities,” but its proposals did not stand up well to the region’s realities. 
Circumstances in Chechnya did not improve after the Khasavyurt Agreement.  
The document ensured that “a joint Russian-Chechen commission was set up to run the 
economy.  The commission was a face-saver for Russia, [however,] since it did virtually 
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nothing during its short existence and the Chechens soon took over.”90  Former Russian 
Interior Minister Anatoliy S. Kulikov describes the subsequent stagnant economy, 
rampant unemployment, vigorous arms trade, terror, kidnapping, and growing culture of 
violence.  As bad as things were under Dudayev, he implies, the Chechen president’s 
death brought a dangerous vacuum in leadership: 
Chechen leaders cannot influence the field commanders or their armed 
formations, nor solve any of the republic’s everyday socio-economic 
problems.  Hence, they attempt to distract the people and quell their 
growing dissatisfaction.  They do this by further igniting anti-Russian 
sentiments, inculcating extremist Islamic ideology and carrying out 
“cosmetic” reorganizations in the government that supposedly show the 
official government becoming stronger.  With the goal of forcing Russia 
out of the Caucasus completely, foreign fundamentalist Islamic 
organizations and special services from a number of states are helping 
Chechnya move toward becoming an Islamic state.  These same 
organizations are in no rush to help Russia resolve any of Chechnya’s 
social or economic problems.91  
He surmises that these conditions had pushed Chechen foreign policy to seek 
international recognition and money, but the lack of both a viable economy and real 
Russian acquiescence to its development had prevented success.  The attempt to pull 
neighboring Dagestan into the Chechen orbit is thus natural, according to Kulikov: 
They fully understand that if their plan succeeds, Chechnya gains access to 
Caspian Sea oil resources and establishes control over the region’s key 
transportation nodes and communication lines.  They assume that having 
control of these resources will bring recognition of Chechnya’s 
independence by states interested in developing economic relations with 
the North Caucasus.   Even if recognition fails, at the very least large-scale 
foreign investments would flow into the region.92 
It was no surprise to the Russian leadership when the Chechens did, in fact, move 
on Dagestan in August of 1999.  Chechen guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev (“regarded as 
one of the great contemporary Chechen heroes”93 after the aforementioned Budennovsk 
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incident) took several villages and attempted to establish Islamic law inside them.  
Though also a Islamic, the Dagestanis were not the majority in their more pluralistic 
republic and Dagestan as a whole proved unreceptive to the Chechen effort.  It took 
Russian forces six weeks to drive Basayev and his guerrillas back into Chechnya; it is 
likely that greater Russian attention to force readiness before deployment would have 
expelled the insurgents sooner. 
 A concurrent series of terrorist bombings in Russia and a new, more vigorous 
prime minister in the Kremlin—Vladimir Putin—galvanized Russian public opinion 
toward a second invasion “to protect the population from crime and terrorism.”94  
According to former Russian Ethno-national relations advisor Emil Pain, success in 
Dagestan was especially important: 
People began saying that the Chechen problem could be solved by force, 
that an “iron hand” could restore order in the entire country.  Previously it 
was General Alexander Lebed who had personified the image of the 
strong leader, but now that image belongs to Vladimir Putin.  The 
Chechen war added to the new Prime Minister’s respect.  As time went by, 
Putin began to use this newfound political capital and respect to win 
support for the federal government’s militaristic policy in the North 
Caucasus.95  
The invasion plan was divided into three phases—an air campaign, a ground 
campaign, and subsequent “destruction of bandit groups in the mountains while restoring 
law and order and establishing conditions for the return of refugees to their homes.”96  
The political goal morphed over time, seemingly to grasp and maintain public support: 
The first goal was to repulse Chechen aggression; then the goal was to 
establish a sanitary cordon to protect Russian regions from Chechen raids; 
and by November 1999 the goal had become the complete annihilation of 
the ‘terrorists’.  Putin changed that goal once more on 1 January 2000 
when he noted that the operation was designed to ‘protect the integrity of 
Russia.97 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 50-51. 
95 Pain, 61. 
96 Wallwork, 52. 
97 Timothy L. Thomas, “Information Warfare in the Second (1999-) Chechen War: Motivator for 
Military Reform,” in Russian Military Reform1992-2002, ed. Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott, 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 222. 
38 
Putin also “gave the military carte blanche to conduct the operations as they saw fit and 
provided them with considerably more resources than they had had in the first war (italics 
in original).”98  
 Meanwhile, Russia’s military forces continued the aforementioned post-Cold War 
decline and a conscious effort was made to avoid urban training in her schools. 
The blood their troops shed in Grozny convinced Russian planners that the 
best approach to urban combat was to avoid it altogether.  Soldiers and 
officers should prepare to prevent an urban fight, not to win it.  Therefore, 
training for urban combat was deemed a waste of time and money.99 
This does not mean that the Russian military blundered back into Chechnya without a 
plan for conducting the urban fight.  Just like it had done opposite the Finns’ Mannerheim 
Line in 1940, the general staff started evaluating lessons learned all the way back to 
Afghanistan.  According to scholar Robert M. Cassidy, when the Russians realized that 
the metaphorical piñata was actually a beehive, they decided to employ their superior 
technology against it.  “[D]uring the second Chechen conflict, the Russians relied more 
on their technological advantages in artillery and bombing stand-off ranges to avoid close 
urban combat…”100 
One suggested method was first to isolate all avenues of approach to a defended 
city and employ reconnaissance assets to find key installations and buildings on the city 
perimeter.  Secondly, artillery preparation and occupation of assault positions would 
enable seizing these objectives.  The third action would be seizure of—in order—the 
city’s residential, industrial, and central sections.  The final and probably most difficult 
step consisted of eliminating trapped enemy units, clearing mines, confiscating weapons, 
and establishing military control.101  The test of this new doctrine would show the 
Russian protagonist, further weakened since the Cold War and bled from its first 
encounter with the “piñata”, playing to his strengths. 
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The Chechens, by contrast, were neither short of funds nor volunteers as both 
rolled in from around the Islamic world.  Training camps around Chechnya once again 
countered the Russian superiority in fires by teaching asymmetric solutions: tactics of 
terrorists and partisans, marksmanship, heavy weapons employment and maintenance, 
diversionary methods, psychological operations and ideological warfare.102 
The Russian colossus thus moved once again toward his objective.  This time he 
approached the hive wielding not a sledge but a shotgun.  He had a notebook of lessons 
learned in his back pocket and a Russian public cheering him on.  He was even skinnier 
now and scarred up by the stings of 1994-96.  Most importantly, that experience had 
pulled the blindfold from his eyes and, since the bees had earlier followed him back to his 
house, he was arguably more determined to neutralize the hive. 
A. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE 
At the end of September 1999, The Russia Journal advocated seizing the 
initiative, securing the Dagestani border, and moving Russian operations again into 
Chechnya.  To successfully do so, Russian forces would employ  “massive air-bombing, 
missile strikes, artillery shelling, and special operations aimed at wiping out 
terrorists.”103  The key, according to this article, lay in intelligence support to Russian 
troops. 
By this point, the Chechens had a diverse array of intelligence collection assets, 
including optical-electronic, acoustic, radiotechnical, and radar technology.104  To 
communicate this information, Chechen collectors, hubs, and warfighters used cellular, 
ham radio, both stationary and mobile tele-broadcast stations, short wave, and cable 
COTS technology.  “Satellite communications in Chechnya were conducted via 
INMARSAT and IRIDIUM systems, offering access to both intercity and international 
communication nets, and the Internet.”105 
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While this simpler yet robust intelligence apparatus appeared formidable, Russia, 
which had worked for the entire Cold War to gain advantage over NATO—the world’s 
most technologically capable alliance, could better exploit and counter such measures.  
Russian Radio Electronic Combat (REB) units brought Vega radio-technical 
reconnaissance systems to Chechnya while both GRU (Russian military Main 
Intelligence Directorate) and FAPSI (Federal Agency of Government Communications 
and Information) assets began intercepting Chechen communications and harvesting data 
via radio electronic reconnaissance satellites.  With this augmented SIGINT effort, the 
technical means like those that facilitated Dudayev’s death were employed with greater 
frequency: 
In order to “take out” a transmitter, radio interceptors first ascertain the 
location of a target.  A reconnaissance group then goes out to discover the 
precise location of the enemy, and to ensure that the ‘intercept’ is real and 
not set up to ensure unacceptable collateral damage to the civilian 
population.  Once the target is verified, the information is passed to the 
fire control command post, and a strike launched.106 
One can presume that repeated experience shortened each cycle’s duration from radio 
intercept to call for fire.  Even if such a strike was unsuccessful or not tasked, collected 
coordinates for Chechen “communications centers, control points, concentration of 
forces, and firing means” enabled Russian analysts to paint a fairly accurate picture of the 
adversary’s communications network. 
The Russian commanders called these REB groupings the eyes and ears of 
the forces.  Their systems’ ability to supply real-time enemy emission 
sources that were used for target reconnaissance and target data served, in 
essence for the first time, as prototypes of reconnaissance-strike systems 
on the tactical and operational levels.107 
The improvements to these units revealed enhanced resource allocation.  
“Whereas in 1994-1995 the Russians were limited to a relatively narrow bandwidth, this 
time Russia’s electronic warriors were able to operate on more frequencies.  
Improvements in training and equipment made it far easier for them to track the source of 
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enemy transmissions.”108  In contrast to the 1994 invasion, one may surmise that a 
Chechen guerrilla switched on a radio with a bit more wariness.  Each time a clever 
insurgent attempted to manipulate a Russian Close Air Support mission, for instance, 
there was a greater chance he would be putting himself in the crosshairs. 
 This “reconnaissance-strike” cycle, however, did not demand cuing from a 
communications specialist.  Another contrast to the previous invasion lay in more robust 
and efficient employment of ground reconnaissance units.  In mid-November, Russia 
infiltrated the Grozny outskirts before the main force surrounded the city two weeks later.  
“[S]niper teams, supported by the army and MVD special forces units, found targets and, 
equally important, provided intelligence on the whereabouts and movements of Chechen 
forces in the city.  The snipers served as spotters and called down artillery fire on 
suspected rebel positions.”109  Support that U.S. ground commanders take for granted, 
such as topogeodesic “terrain” teams and meteorological specialists, were also on hand, 
more diligent, and better organized for the Second invasion.110  Improved technology for 
collection, though, represents only a fraction of the total sensory input available in urban 
warfare.  The Russians considered the more low-tech platforms and augmented that 
capability this time as well. 
 For the 1999 invasion, Russian forces also brought more reliable Chechen loyalist 
forces, which vastly improved human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities: 
[This development] overcame many problems associated with tactics and 
language in the city.  Chechen combatants friendly to the federal cause 
and led by (loyalist Bislan) Gantemirov could talk with the local 
population and get intelligence on the rebel positions and dispositions.  
Chechen human intelligence often proved more valuable than Russian 
signal intelligence.111 
One can safely assume that this development also improved Russian signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), as few people outside the Chechen culture can converse in its indigenous 
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language.  Russian troops would therefore be more aware of their environment this time 
and could thus incorporate gathered information into a more sophisticated targeting 
mindset.  In the past invasion, Russian forces worked to simplify the urban terrain by 
pounding a three-dimensional landscape into two.  Consequent collateral damage and 
danger to noncombatants predictably contributed to the aforementioned erosion of 
support from the Chechen citizenry.  The 1999 operation reveals evidence of a shift from 
concentration on terrain to a more effects-based targeting scheme: 
The second war saw strikes against key nodes such as the phone system 
and the electricity supply designed to reduce the ability of the Chechens to 
control their operation.  This also restricted the ability of the Chechens to 
fight the information war as successfully.112 
Developments in targeting therefore contributed to the overall improvement in Russian 
intelligence activity between the wars.  Whereas in the first war this force mirror-imaged 
its enemy, carelessly passed the SIGINT advantage to him, and apparently conducted 
reconnaissance for its armored columns by drawing fire, Russian IPB efforts in the 
second showed much improvement.  The hypothetical protagonist did not charge toward 
Grozny this time blindly swinging.  
B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
If Russian IPB identified and targeted the adversary’s ability to send messages 
beyond his borders, so too did Russian Public Affairs.  If the new post-Soviet Russian 
government made serious mistakes in its 1994-96 PA effort, the 1999 performance shows 
both improvements and an augmented initiative to make them. 
Emil Pain, in his 2000 article “The Second Chechen War: The Information 
Component,” describes this initiative’s evolution: 
After the first Chechen war, the Russian military concluded that it had lost 
the information war to the Chechen resistance, which had morally 
disarmed Russian public opinion.  Hence, Russian strategists saw 
reprogramming the public consciousness as the primary goal in their battle 
with  the  Chechen  separatists.   They  wanted  to  eliminate public apathy  
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toward the military’s task of retaining Chechnya as part of Russia.  They 
wanted to win public support of Moscow’s use of force against the 
Chechen separatists.113 
According to Pain’s statistics, the subsequent Public Affairs effort successfully coupled 
this support to the government engine.  Between October 1995 and November 1999, for 
instance, when a random survey asked if the Chechnya effort was necessary to prevent 
the collapse of Russia, the “Agree” column had jumped by 33 percent.  When asked if 
Russia should conduct “military actions until the Chechen fighters are completely 
destroyed,” respondents showed a 60 percent gain in agreement.114  How did this occur?  
There are three generally recognized factors in the shift in Russian public support. 
First, the Russian government acknowledged and worked to remedy the dearth of 
an effective Public Affairs effort.  In December 1999, President Yeltsin—on his way out 
of the Kremlin—enacted Russian Federation Resolution Number 1538, to “filter military 
information from Chechnya, and to select which foreign information would be 
disseminated in Russia about the conflict.”115  The simultaneous creation of the Russian 
Information Center (RIC) constituted an important component in this filtration process.  
“The RIC,” according to Pain, “filters information from the combat theater before it 
reaches the mass media.  It also selects for dissemination information from the foreign 
press that does not contradict the Russian government’s view of events in Chechnya.”116 
Any change in doctrine, however, needed a tough and driven helmsman to 
monitor the environment and keep the initiative on course.  A month after the 
announcement of Resolution 1538, acting President Vladimir Putin thus appointed 
Yeltsin’s Press Secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky to oversee the Kremlin’s PA for its 
activities in Chechnya.  He soon began to tighten restrictions on the media and its access  
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to the battlefield.  His threats against the careers of maverick Russian reporters, however,  
would do little to curb the international media’s enthusiasm.  His consequent statements 
are thus worthy of notice: 
…Yastrzhembsky displayed contempt for Western opinion that he 
regarded as predictably negative, citing the fact that Western media had 
been particularly harmful to Russia’s military actions in Chechnya in the 
past.  He cited the West’s oil interests in the Caucasus and a desire to see 
Russia fail in Chechnya and lose influence in the region as reasons for 
negative Western reporting…  The military mass media repeated this 
theme (“Western oil interests are out to submarine Russian interests in the 
Caspian”) on many occasions.117 
His efforts to restrict Russian Mass Media, to denigrate reporting from foreign sources, 
and his particular concerns about the power of television,118 certainly attached a filter to 
the outflow end of the information pipe.  The subsequent trickle of Chechen propaganda 
to the Russian populace displays a marked contrast to that of the 1994-96 operation. 
 The recently concluded NATO Operation Allied force to liberate Kosovo surely 
influenced Yastrzhembsky’s fixation on television.  The impact of this 1999 air campaign 
over the Balkans represented the second factor in Russian PA improvement between the 
Chechen wars.  “In Russian eyes,” according to Pain, “the bombings of civilian targets 
that took the lives of innocent civilians and even foreign diplomats justify similar actions 
by the Russian military.”  Furthermore, Yastrzhembsky’s anti-Western remarks 
capitalized on the fact that “statements by politicians and public officials from NATO 
countries that Russia has exceeded the acceptable limits in the use of force are perceived 
in Russia as hypocritical, a political double standard.”119  NATO dropping its bombs into 
a sovereign Serbia (with a similar Slavic, Orthodox Christian culture) in order to curtail a 
centuries-old ethnic conflict over the secessionist Kosovar region held serious 
implications for the Kremlin.  The Serbs had fought a conflict that was older than and as 
bloody as Russia’s efforts to subdue the Caucasus.  The end of the Cold War also brought 
both sides’ fervent nationalism to the fore—just as it had in Chechnya—and destroying 
an adversary’s ability to make war appeared to lead to the peace table.  In contrast to 
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1994’s confusing Rules of Engagement and infantry-intensive urban combat, therefore, a 
Russian strategy of employing indiscriminate air and artillery to meet its strategic goals 
appeared less odious (and more promising) in light of the Kosovo precedent. 
These two factors—the evaluation of PA and Operation Allied Force—enabled 
the third.  Vladimir Putin and his appeals to patriotic fervor in the face of Chechen 
lawlessness had accordingly stoked the Russian national will.  When Yeltsin stepped 
down in 1999, his prime minister, Putin, became acting president.  His duties were, 
however, not the only baggage Yeltsin could pass on to Putin.  “Public opinion polls 
revealed that there was little support for Yel’tsin.  He was widely perceived to be 
responsible for the financial collapse that had resulted in the devaluation of the rouble in 
August 1998, and these events had destroyed what little legitimacy he had.”120  The 
outgoing president’s obvious linkages with the first Chechen war also lay heavy on the 
Russian public. 
 Putin’s relative clarity of purpose regarding Chechnya certainly endeared him to 
the Ministry of Defense: 
[Putin wanted to] protect Russia against terrorism and instability 
encroaching from the south.  The armed forces eagerly embraced this 
clarity, which also involved an opportunity to cover the defeat in 
Chechnya with a new victory, as well as the new leader, who appeared to 
have a genuine affection for ‘big guns’.  This mission secured the army an 
instant stream of support and sympathy from society…121 
If the situation in Chechnya was an ailment, Putin, did not just offer a prognosis.  His 
frequent encouragement to the Russian patient made him a very popular physician: 
…Putin played a prominent role in leading and coordinating the anti-
terrorist operation.  He was uncompromising in his determination to 
exterminate what he saw as a terrorist nest in Chechnya, stating in 
September that Russian forces would ‘be following terrorists everywhere.  
If we catch them in a toilet, then we will bury them in their own crap’.  His 
rise in the opinion polls was correspondingly meteoric (italics in 
original).122 
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Putin’s rhetoric and Chechen acts of terror fanned the flames of nationalism on both 
sides.  He charged that Chechen terrorists planned to “break up” and “Islamize” Russia123 
and referred to Chechen insurgents as “scum”.124  Putin’s language and direct manner left 
little confusion as to how he perceives his—and Russia’s—security responsibilities. 
 Leadership comes from the top down, the old saying goes, and a new syntax 
arrived with the new President to describe Russian efforts in the Caucasus.  Journalists 
now mimicked the Russian military’s language.  “Aircraft are not bombing and the 
artillery is not firing on towns, but rather, as the journalists put it, they are ‘working on 
towns.’”125  In the first campaign, Russian forces ‘assaulted’ Grozny; now they conduct 
‘special operations’, ‘mop-up’ towns126, or conduct ‘cleansing’ operations.127  In contrast 
to the first invasion, Russian journalists appeared to have grown nearer to the aspirations 
of Russian commanders. 
 In the second Chechen War, according to one expert, reporters were less likely to 
aid the Chechen insurgents in any case.  The reasons for this change of heart are well-
defined and well–known.  Firstly, the practice of kidnapping Westerners netted several 
journalists, a situation that soon reflected ire in Russian publications.  In some of these 
kidnappings, hostages ended up dead, including non-governmental organization workers 
and private businessmen working to improve the situation in the Caucasus.  The 
aforementioned incursion into Dagestan was clearly an act of aggression and the press 
described it as such.  Any attempt to describe the average Chechen insurgent as an 
underdog who wanted to finish the war so he could go back to peacefully herding goats 
suffered accordingly.  “Finally,” information warfare expert Tim Thomas writes, “the 
Russian government accused the Chechens of bombing several apartment complexes in 
Russia itself, bringing terrorism not only to Russia’s doorstep but inside its house.  This 
changed the minds of many Russians, including reporters.”128  Indeed, to the average 
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Russian, Chechnya’s descent into lawlessness was one thing.  Its migration into the 
heartland through the medium of terror was something else entirely and therefore 
demanded action. 
 To counter this, the Chechens used nearly the same PA techniques as they had 
since 1994.  “Missions included forming an anti-military mood and a desire to stop 
military activity, discredit activities and the military-political leadership of Russia, and 
misinform Russia’s leadership about future Chechen plans.”129 
September 1999, however, offered the Russians an opportunity to counter these 
efforts and this opportunity was fully exploited.  In the midst of the Dagestan operation, 
the Kremlin received a video of Chechen guerrillas decapitating a Russian prisoner.  
Russian TV showed the film unedited, which brought two of the previously mentioned 
facets of the Public Affairs conflict to the fore.  First, this gruesome spectacle revealed a 
clear change in government resolve as the Kremlin pushed the throttle to the stops.  
Broadcasting this video served to wipe out the last residue of Russian sympathy for 
Chechen fighters; the Russian public was now less likely to admonish its government for 
regulating messages in the media.  Second, .the populace watching this new development 
had recently experienced the NATO air armada’s progress over Kosovo each night on the 
television news.  “This translated into permission to apply force in Chechnya, since 
Russia faced problems with Chechens similar to Kosovo’s problems with the Serbs, from 
a Russian perspective.”130  This catalyzing event enabled a largely unrestricted Russian 
PA effort. 
Villages are liberated at will, casualties are low, civilians respect what 
Russia is doing, and generals describe the flight of the enemy.  TV 
coverage of the war was described as entertainment, since there were no 
dead bodies, only missiles flying and tanks moving.  No casualties were 
shown.  Russian media shaped the flow of information out of Chechnya 
and onto Russian TV screens in a manner unprecedented since the time of 
the USSR.131 
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Soon, however, the aforementioned contrast between the state-controlled message and the 
battlefield reality again eroded some of these gains.  Recent leaps in information 
capability—most notably the internet—are key facets of the new technology that speeds 
this erosive trend.  The juxtaposition of reality and government messages helped bring 
down the Soviet Union in the wake of Afghanistan.  This evolution in information 
technology thus demands some discussion within the scope of this study.  
 Famous “Third Wave” theorists Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe three 
revolutions (the first two being the Neolithic and industrial) where the military and 
economies were transformed and affected entire societies.  The current wave, the Third, 
emphasizes knowledge and intangibility as focal variables in the equation of 
civilizational shift.  The Tofflers have supplied an innovative lens through which scholars 
can scrutinize both glasnost’ and information warfare. 
 As civilization evolves into this third paradigm, it becomes harder for 
governments to control citizens’ access to information.  The previously described erosion 
of Soviet power in the wake of Afghanistan is a fine example; when the government’s 
message to the masses does not correspond to the trickle of unfiltered truth that always 
makes it through, citizens start questioning that government’s credibility.  Often, 
moreover, that constrained measure of information is an essential component for 
competitive innovation: 
The further a country advances toward Third Wave economic and social 
systems, the less likely central censorship or control will work.  Third 
Wave economies thrive on open ideas and information systems, the 
irrepressible Internet being the most obvious example.  The attempt by the 
Soviets to micromanage opinion through monopoly control of the media, 
and their efforts to quarantine the population against news and opinion 
from the outside world, stifled the spirit of innovation—and hence the 
very technical and economic progress that they needed to survive.  The 
Soviets, in fact, waged information warfare against their own people and 
shot themselves in the brain.132 
Like any other technology, however, information technology can represent a tool 
or a weapon depending upon the user’s intent.  Much progress has occurred since 1989 
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(when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan)—more miniaturization, digitization, and 
faster communication, for instance.  When a reporter can capture an event on a cellular 
phone camera and can transmit the image across the world in near-real-time, government 
information control—regardless of its intentions or that event’s context—is not so easy: 
[T]he new media of the Third Wave include powerful new technologies 
that “de-massify” audiences and permit one-to-one customized 
communication.  They also put cheap diffusion power in the hands of 
anyone with access to the Internet.  Marshall McLuhan once wrote that the 
photocopying machine made everyone his or her own publisher.  That was 
true on a tiny scale.  The Internet makes everyone a potential media 
producer on a global scale.133 
This constituted the dilemma for the Putin government: restricting a society’s information 
flow can stifle the innovation that brings economic prosperity.  At the same time, as this 
section has revealed, seizing control of the media had greatly augmented public support 
for the second Chechen war.  While Russians still largely support the effort, there are two 
factors that served to erode confidence in the Kremlin’s Public Affairs apparatus. 
 The first was the Internet, the insurgents’ natural countermeasure to Putin’s 
censorship apparatus.  The Chechens used it to collect financial contributions, to reach 
and inform Chechen expatriates throughout the world, to broadcast streaming videos of 
battlefield successes against Russian forces, to proclaim support for the Palestinian cause 
(thus implicitly linking it to their own), to show alleged Russian atrocities, and to market 
Chechen multimedia propaganda such as compact discs.  Juxtaposed with 
Yastzhembsky’s filtered reports from the front, whether the claims aired on these images 
were accurate representations or not becomes irrelevant.  As religious and political 
extremists around the world have learned, “to put one’s position on an issue and not have 
to justify it”134 is one of the great advantages of disseminating information via this 
medium.  To be sure, the Russian government used it, too, but only as another implement 
from its Public Affairs toolbox.  The Chechens largely alienated the news organizations 
they had carefully cultivated in the first war.  To make up for the loss of international 
media support, Chechen websites were comparatively more dynamic and easier to access 
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internationally than their Russian opposites.  The Kremlin countered Chechen sites via 
hacking or stern warnings against operating them from Russian territory.  This versatile 
information conduit, however, remains open. 
 A second important hindrance to Russian PA is the Committee of Soldiers’ 
Mothers, a Russian grassroots organization and another important legacy from the Soviet 
experience in Afghanistan.  This organization is known for its criticisms of both the 
1994-96 war and the long-standing practice of dyedovshchina (“the exploitation, 
frequently with loathsome cruelty, of the newly joined conscripts by the ‘grandfathers’, 
the older conscripts and the volunteer soldiers”135) in Russian barracks.  When this 
organization began to compile and disseminate its own casualty lists and to publish them 
in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the discrepancy between government propaganda and battlefield 
realities certainly served to erode the Russian public’s trust in its government and—by 
extension—its mass media.136  Like the Internet, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers 
thus represented a facet of the PA war with which the Kremlin would have to struggle 
during hostilities in Chechnya. 
 Emil Pain describes other mitigating factors for Russian Public Affairs.  
Casualties, he writes, “will have the greatest impact in changing society’s mood, 
particularly given that almost none of those who support the military actions wish to 
participate directly or send their children to participate.”137  The participators and their 
families, it follows, will grow even more disenchanted with each new list from the 
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers.  Pain also forecasts that the war’s effects on the Russian 
economy will hold similar erosive effects for the national will. 
In December 1999, former Minister of Finance Mikhail Zadornov estimated that 
7-8 percent of Russia’s national budget went to Chechen operations per month.138  When 
one considers how the economic collapse of 1998 stained the Yeltsin presidency, this rate 
of expenditure holds serious political significance.  The fact that Russia has destroyed 
most of the Chechen economic infrastructure dictates that even with a secessionist defeat, 
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this percentage is going to grow.  Pain summarizes: “[T]he Russian public’s support for 
the second Chechen war is not deep-seated and is largely a consequence of pervasive 
myths and illusions that were created to manipulate public opinion.”139  The costs, 
therefore, of sending uninterested people to fight an expensive war and spurring them on 
with “pervasive myths and illusions” will likely nullify any gains from this improved 
Public Affairs performance.  The insurgents, on the other hand, consistently hurt their 
own Public Affairs effort by exacerbating this perception of lawlessness and 
assassinating their government’s officials. 
 Relative to its performance in the first Chechen war, even with the 
aforementioned factors working against it, the Russian Public Affairs campaign has 
shown improvement.  Restricting journalists’ access to the battlefield, as well as the 
effort to identify Chechen insurgents with international terrorism (especially after 9/11) 
have made this second war more palatable to both Russian and international opinion. 
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
 In 1999 operational planners knew there was a good chance that Russian forces 
would return to the Chechen capital.  From the 1994 war, these planners also knew that 
every person in the urban landscape represented a potential insurgent: 
Unlike more traditional operations in open terrain, where merely spotting 
an unknown entity would assist in deciphering friend from foe, urban 
areas are packed with individuals and groups that might have the 
capabilities, interests, or intentions that can threaten a unit’s mission.  An 
analyst will not be able to distinguish urban friend from foe just by 
looking at him.140 
Identifying the enemy had been, however, only one psychological stressor the Russian 
soldier faced in the first war. 
“It was clear from the fighting in the first Russian-Chechen conflict that the 
moral-psychological stability of a soldier could be easily upset and then manipulated by 
the side with the best information support devices.”141  Accounts of the second war show 
                                                 
139 Pain, 69. 
140 Medby and Glenn, 34. 
141 Thomas, “Information Warfare…,” 224. 
52 
enhanced Russian attention to alleviating battlefield stress and thus taking care of the 
troops on the twenty-first century battlefield. 
Authors John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt begin their book In Athena’s Camp: 
Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (published in 1997) by describing this 
battlefield.  “In the new epoch, decisive duels for the control of information flows will 
take the place of drawn-out battles of attrition or annihilation; the requirement to destroy 
will recede as the ability to disrupt is enhanced.”142  Any scholar can pick out episodes of 
attrition or annihilation in the first conflict, but disruption is also prevalent.  The foe had 
continuously hindered Russian forces’ efforts to perceive and communicate in the 
battlespace.  Chechen insurgents held a robust and diverse set of both methods and 
implements for executing this disruption, but these methods had not evolved much by 
2000: “agitation, leaflets, loudspeakers and radio stations, and capturing Russian soldiers 
by wearing Russian uniforms”143 were all known Chechen methods.  Russian planners 
had had five years to think about countering them by the time Russian soldiers girded 
their loins for Dagestan in 1999. 
The insurgents had heretofore led by a big margin in preparing their own people 
for battle via emphasis on: 
…the use of slogans, swearing allegiance on the Koran, and acceptance of 
the Jihad.  National ideas, Islamic values, and the military history of 
Chechnya were often used in this regard.  Islamic slogans were frequently 
tied to weapons and armoured vehicles.  Work among the population 
included the development of several factors: a base of social-political 
support for the [Chechen] armed forces; the galvanizing of the population 
against Russians operating in their areas; the conduct of mass meeting, and 
teaching how to spread rumours; and the spread of Chechen military 
traditions and the ideas of Islam, using audio-video cassettes, leaflets, 
radio, TV and the press.144 
It would appear that Russian PSYOP in 1999 allocated less effort toward this hardcore 
indoctrinated Chechen guerrilla; the enemy’s motivation was too strong to unravel via the 
available means.  As depicted in the previous section, however, the Kremlin’s Public 
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Affairs effort had effectively grabbed the Russian citizenry’s support.  This left two target 
audiences for Russian psychological operations—the Russian soldier and the weary 
Chechen populace. 
 The first and most basic mental armor Russia could give to its soldiers was a clear 
reason why they were returning.  Imbuing forces with a historical justification and a 
strategic mission became a major and justifiable goal.  On April 25, 2000 Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta published a statement from Colonel-General V. Manilov that elucidates this 
improved mindset.  “Today,” he wrote, “Russia stands square on to the threat in the North 
Caucasus, defending not only its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the law and freedom 
of its citizens, but also Europe, and the whole world from the strengthening criminal-
terrorist abyss.”145 
This self-identification with defending and preserving civilization was hardly new 
to Russia.  The post-Cold War environment, however, offered at least one example of a 
former communist state slipping into chaos—an event that catalyzed Russian nationalism 
into action.  In analyzing a 1999 piece by historian Roy Medvedev, one author summed 
up the contemporary Russian concern.  Should Chechnya win its independence, “the very 
existence of the Federation itself as a multi-ethnic, multi-national state would be in 
serious doubt, and that, which had been built up over centuries, would descend into a 
multi-ethnic, warring mess, similar to the situation in the former Yugoslavia over the past 
decade.”146  If nothing else, clarity of purpose in this new war helped block some of the 
soldiers’ anxiety regarding the task of fighting one’s own citizens. 
 In the Soviet Union, of course, political commissars were attached to military 
units to look after moral and psychological preparation.  After 1991, it is not known 
whether any sort of political officers remained in the ranks; if such personnel remained, 
their activities became less obvious to observers.  Both Chechen wars, however, had 
demanded constant vigilance from the individual soldier.  Juxtaposed with awful weather  
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conditions, the psychological pressure in Chechnya necessitated action from the Russian 
government to fill this post-Soviet ideological vacuum and thus keep its troops motivated 
under adverse conditions. 
 Any military professional who has gone to the field knows the value of logistics 
to his troops’ morale.  Soldiers in miserable conditions respond well to hot meals and 
clean, dry protective clothing.  Serious effort was made to provide these items along with 
other staples like fuel, ammunition, and vehicle maintenance.  Medical care, once troops 
arrived at battalion aid stations, was better than adequate.  Russian logisticians had 
noticed and adapted to many of these issues early on in the first war (though items such 
as clean drinking water147 and spare parts148 were always problematic).  Postal service 
improved alongside recognition via battlefield awards and decorations.149  In summation, 
“Russia’s troops in Chechnya in 1999-2000, regardless of their service affiliation, were 
much better supplied than their predecessors.  Soldiers had sufficient uniforms and 
generally received their rations.”150 
 Efficient supply, however, is not the only variable in an army’s psychological 
maintenance equation.  No matter how many beans and bullets the Russian staff threw at 
the conflict, something else was needed to counter tried and true Chechen psychological 
actions such as mutilation, torture, or using Russian casualties (alive or not) as cover 
during firefights.  Educating Russian soldiers was one such measure, beginning with a 
periodic newsletter published by the North Caucasus Military District.  Specially 
designated personnel began to visit units to teach soldiers about Chechen propaganda 
techniques and their intended effects.  These instructors offered guidance about 
interaction with local civil and religious representatives as they cautioned soldiers to 
remain aloof from favors and disinformation.151  In fact, many of the former 
Commissars’  practices  appeared  again,  such  as  “twice  daily  fifteen  minute  combat  
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briefings; a weekly political hour; weekly combat news sheets about soldiers who 
displayed gallantry; daily listening to radio news; agitators’ conversations with personnel; 
and regular delivery of newspapers.”152 
The Russians also brought more mental health expertise to the fight: 
[Military Psychological Support] tasks included psychological preparation 
of servicemen for close support of combat operations, and psychological 
aid to servicemen when it was needed.  Psychological preparation 
included practice in specific combat situations, and teaching methods of 
psychological self-regulation and emotional mobilization in times of 
stress.  Psychological aid was focused at the combat crew and vehicle 
crew level.  Mobile groups of psychologists with skills in psycho-
diagnostics and correction and rehabilitation work, psychiatrists and 
psycho-neurologists did consultative and diagnostic work.  Psycho-
correction and rehabilitation programmes were provided on an as-needed 
basis.153 
This augmented logistic, education, and medical support thus showed vast improvement 
over the first war.  Replacements and more frequent unit rest and relaxation rotations also 
aided this endeavor,154; integrating these replacements and conducting training with 
fully-present, cohesive units has been identified as a key factor in overcoming the 
psychological stress of urban combat.155 
 While these gains in preparing young Russian troops for combat were remarkable, 
the overall Russian PSYOP performance in the Second Chechen War was mitigated by 
further alienation of Chechen noncombatants.  Commanders’ inclinations to reduce 
Russian casualties, alongside the clear firepower advantage and less restrictive rules of 
engagement in the wake of Chechen terror attacks, created an environment receptive to 
more firepower.  After all, the shock and the psychological terror produced by artillery 
and air strikes have long been considered by some leadership elements to be a 
psychological weapon. 
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 Consider the reaction of one veteran CIA agent to a demonstration of the World 
War II era Katyusha surface-to-surface missile in 1984.  This antiquated 122mm rocket, 
lobbed into the Egyptian desert, created quite an impression: 
If you’ve ever heard one of these come at you, there’s no way you 
wouldn’t crap in your pants.  I was three miles away from where it hit and 
I was scared.  It was a frightening experience, like being in a minor 
earthquake.  You just can’t imagine what it would be like to be within fifty 
feet of one of those things.156 
More up-to-date surface-to-surface missiles (like the SCUD and SCARAB) were only 
one component of the Russian firepower demonstration in the Second Chechen War.  
Aerial bombs and fuel air explosives were also employed to cause “shock” and 
“psychological terror”. 
 RAND Corporation analyst Olga Oliker writes that improvement occurred in 
close air support coordination.  “This was despite poor weather and smoke and fog from 
oil fires and fighting that sometimes precluded the effective use of combat aircraft.  
Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft were responsible for a lot of fire support.”157  This 
translates, of course, to more bombs on target and less fratricide, which one would 
assume improved Russian morale. 
 These conventional weapons, however, were only so effective against guerrillas 
hiding in bunkers and basements.  The Russian solution to this problem was thermobaric 
weaponry.  Its concept is simple, but catastrophic: 
Fuel-air weapons work by initially detonating a scattering charge within a 
bomb, rocket or grenade warhead.  The warhead contents, which are 
composed of either volatile gases, liquids, or finely powdered explosives, 
form an aerosol cloud.  This cloud is then ignited and the subsequent 
fireball sears the surrounding area while consuming the oxygen in this 
area.  The lack of oxygen creates an enormous overpressure.  This 
overpressure, or blast wave, is the primary casualty-producing force.158 
Pressure at the explosion’s center can hit 427 pounds per square inch and a temperature 
of over 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit.  Loose objects are pulled toward the center to fill the 
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void, causing further damage to personnel beyond severe crushing and burning effects.  It 
is effective against terrain, fortifications, equipment, foxholes, minefields, and 
vegetation.  In its indiscriminate and destructive effects, “a fuel-air explosive can have 
the effect of a tactical nuclear weapon without residual radiation.”159  The obvious 
attraction for using them against urban communication centers and strongpoints made the 
thermobaric weapon a very popular option for Russian commanders. 
 Fire and iron, however, are not the only items with which Russian forces watered 
the Grozny garden.  Beginning in early December 1999, the Russian aircraft dropped 
leaflets to warn noncombatants away from the battlespace.  Loudspeakers advocated 
surrender as government forces set up assembly areas for anyone wishing to capitulate.160  
Then strike aircraft rolled in, guns traversed, and fuel-air rockets arced toward the capital 
as reconnaissance units called for fires.  The intended audience probably received the 
Russian preparatory PSYOP message but it is doubtful the recipients could do much with 
it—the guerrilla fighters were not likely to surrender and all the capable noncombatants 
had already moved on: 
Grozny had 20,000 to 30,000 residents still huddled in basements when 
the battle for the city began.  These residents were too old, too afraid or 
too isolated to exit the city.  Reportedly, about 4,000 Chechen fighters 
remained in the city.  Russian psychological operations depicted the 
defenders as Muslim fanatics and agents of an international, 
fundamentalist terror network161. 
Russian forces had surrounded the city and slowly moved toward Minutka Square, a hub 
for major roads and subterranean communications lines.  Strike aircraft employed their 
mobility advantage by servicing a target list that spanned the region—“suspected terrorist 
hideouts, cellular relay towers and communications facilities…  They sought to isolate 
the defenders in Grozny from any external support and supply.”162  Russian planners 
knew, from the first war, the psychological blow one experiences when his logistics are 
retarded and his communications network is unreliable. 
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 The balance sheet shows that Russian PSYOP had therefore improved when 
compared to the first war.  The great herd of confused, uninformed, frightened Russian 
conscripts riding to their doom in downtown Grozny with total strangers, inadequate 
equipment, and un-secure communications were a thing of the past.  The Russian soldier 
of 1999 was better clothed, fed, indoctrinated, and medically treated.  He knew his 
superiors’ goals and his unit had trained together to realize them.  Through better Public 
Affairs and media management, his government had both assured him of the Russian 
public’s support and shielded him from the distraction of foreign information and 
propaganda sources. 
 The enemy, however, seemed no less resolute.  Whether it had utilized Islam, 
nationalism, or the cultural network, the opposition had bound its fighters together with a 
code that loudspeakers and leaflets were not going to penetrate. 
 The average Chechen citizen fared worst.  Whether in the urban capital or the 
rural hamlet, there was an overwhelming chance he would lose his home and livelihood.  
The Russian shift to a doctrine of pulling troops back from obstacles and blowing those 
obstacles apart improved forward momentum, but served to further alienate the people 
that Russian forces had arrived to gallantly rescue from pervasive terror and banditry.  
Huddling in one’s basement to ride out an artillery barrage probably provided some terror 
in itself.  At the same time, the deliberate Russian effort to eradicate the insurgency’s 
infrastructure—supplies, consumers, communications channels, and logistics apparatuses 
that also served the struggling economy—may have been perceived as simply more 
banditry. 
D. BATTLEFIELD COMMUNICATIONS 
To assess improvement in Russian battlefield communications between the first 
and second wars, one must look at both technical innovations (or their absence) and 
changes in Russian tactics whence one can derive the true advances in this realm. 
The Russian forces brought better equipment and trained personnel to operate it.  
Secure communications, the bugbear of the first invasion, had been identified as a 
problem and by October 1999 the Chief of Signal Troops, Colonel-General Yuri Zalogin, 
acknowledged this problem to the press.  “He cited the lack of encryption devices for 
59 
secure communications during the 1994-1996 Chechen conflict as a serious shortcoming 
for the federal forces.  Zalogin noted that the latest Akveduk communication equipment 
would be delivered in November 1999 to almost every soldier… [who would thus] have 
the capability to send and receive scrambled communications, making it impossible for 
unauthorized persons to intercept or decipher transmissions.”163  Providing this 
technological remedy, however, meant little if the soldiers did not understand or use it.  
According to Oliker, “Russian troops [still] repeatedly rendered their advanced 
technology meaningless by communicating in the open.  This enabled the rebels to evade 
their assaults and to ambush them.”164  At the same time, tactical field radios quickly 
drain batteries, and the Russian military took action to make these batteries more 
compatible with a greater variety of battlefield communication devices and therefore 
make greater use of their inventories.165 
The Chechens improved their own communications capability, once again, via 
COTS technology.  In the period between wars the insurgents had acquired a two-base-
station analog cellular network and set up a relay in neighboring Ingushetia to 
compensate for the region’s destroyed telephone system.  The aforementioned Western- 
and Asian-produced hand-held radios supplemented this system; “the cellular network 
allowed each field commander to link with a network of 20-60 individuals, while radio 
transmitters allowed 60-80 personnel at a time to receive intelligence data.”166 
Both sides increasingly employed satellite communications as well.  The 
Chechens again used Motorola Iridium handheld devices, which enabled international 
communication and Internet access.  For a smaller, robust network of Chechen insurgents 
this was an ideal arrangement.  The Russian effort to provide its larger conventional force 
with satellite communications was more problematic: 
In August 2001, Colonel A.A. Petrov and Lieutenant-Colonel A.L. 
Safronov wrote in Voennaya Mysl’ that satellite communications had 
improved command and control immeasurably.  They noted that over 50 
satellite communications stations attached to units and sub-units were used 
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effectively in Chechnya to organize communications.  Yet even this 
number of sets did not completely satisfy troop needs, as they lacked light, 
mobile, armour-protected stations.  The satellites were also a problem due 
to their low traffic capacity.167 
Hence Russian forces confronted two questions inherent in modern military 
communications: Is the equipment rugged enough and is there enough bandwidth to go 
around? 
The real improvement in Russian battlefield communications was visible not in 
the nuts and bolts, but the coordination successes that can only arise from a combat-
derived learning curve and the subsequent change in battlefield procedures.  There is no 
doubt that the Russians held the superior technology and firepower in this conflict.  
History shows, however, that it is not technology itself, but the organization of available 
technology that wins wars.  “Technological superiority, i.e. superior platforms and 
weapons, mean little without organizational superiority.  And organizational superiority 
alone probably is worth more than superior platforms and weapons (italics in 
original).”168 
Again, there are periods in Russian military history (Finland, the Second World 
War, i.e.) notable for a pause, a re-evaluation, and re-engagement on terms more 
favorable to Russian/Soviet capability.  What advantages could Russian forces exploit in 
Chechnya?  A GLONASS satellite orbiting the earth, one could easily argue, represents a 
superior platform.  Its technological capabilities, fitted into a prime organizational 
context, “increased efficiency of missile troops and artillery units by 40 per cent.  
Munition consumption is cut four or five times, and artillery munitions by 1.7 to three 
times.”169  Russian weaponry, such as precision air and artillery munitions, was certainly 
superior to the adversary’s and likely holds a big portion of the increased efficiency 
described above.  This marriage of platforms and weaponry, therefore, yielded some 
success in the Second Chechen War.  Russian forces, however, needed an organizational 
change to take advantage of it. 
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Again, Afghanistan emerged as a classroom where students had learned valuable 
lessons and then forgot them at the recess bell: “The Afghan war demonstrated the need 
for better organized tactical groupings, for commanders to understand how to direct 
artillery or air support or to use reconnaissance troops properly, for infantry sections to be 
trained in fire and manoeuvre tactics and for snipers to be trained and used properly.  All 
these lessons and many others were neglected or deliberately ignored, only to be repeated 
in the first Chechen war.”170 During the years between Khasavyurt and Dagestan, 
however, Russian military analysts took advantage of the pause and re-evaluated their 
methodology for taking down the modern city: “The Russians now conclude that high-
tempo mounted thrusts to seize cities are obsolete and that contemporary urban combat 
requires deliberate reduction.”171  The aforementioned increasing investment in 
personnel via training and psychological preparation increased the soldier’s value as a 
warfighting resource. 
At the same time, Ministry of Defense formations held superiority in technology 
and weaponry—especially artillery.  The subsequent plan—to empower tactical units to 
pull back 300 meters (the maximum effective range of both the Kalashnikov and RPG-
7)172 and attack enemy strongpoints with indirect fire—thus conserved people while 
playing to strengths in fire support resources. 
This new organizational model was known as the “zonal-target fire strike 
method” and its inherent “decentralized fire control allowed lower echelons initiative for 
more active, responsive and effective artillery use.”173  The new practice of attaching a 
mortar or artillery battery to the paratroop or motorized rifle company certainly aided 
decentralization; if that unit needed more firepower, however, a quick call to the 
Battalion staff kick-started the zonal-target machine.  This was quite a change from the 
previous fire support apparatus: 
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Historically, to conduct a fire strike against an enemy, information from 
all types of reconnaissance flowed into the highest headquarters, which 
then assigned targets for all firing weapons, including mortars.  Only then 
did information flow down the chain of command.  This inefficient use of 
time-sensitive reconnaissance data often allowed the target to move before 
the fire mission could be conducted.174 
One can imagine the gains in accuracy, speed, and efficiency from such a system.  The 
lynchpin of fire support—that essential component that maximizes effects while 
minimizing the possibility of fratricide—is communications capability.  From the 
“Troops in Contact!” call to adjustment to battle damage assessment, reliable 
communication is focal. 
 Decentralization and enhanced communication also enabled some of the complex 
fire missions that Russian forces had not employed since Afghanistan: the fire block, 
artillery sweep, defensive box barrage, and fire corridor.  Inadequate efforts to transmit 
lessons learned in combat caused some planners to erroneously regard these techniques as 
“new” when brought back for the second Chechen war:175 
Fire blocks are standing barrages designed to keep an enemy force from 
escaping.  Artillery fire sweeps are the systematic use of evenly-spaced 
long range artillery fire to harass and damage an enemy located in an 
inaccessible area.  Defensive box barrages are artillery fires which ring a 
forward defensive position to prevent an enemy from overrunning it.  Fire 
corridors integrate the fires of several artillery battalions to shell possible 
enemy mortar and artillery sites systematically while conducting barrage 
fires on areas of possible enemy action.176 
Hence advances in Russian battlefield communications facilitated more complex but 
effective fire support practices.  Artillery, however, is not the only arm to benefit from 
this improvement. 
 One must not forget that air forces also provide fire support and that fratricide is 
no less a concern.  “In these early stages [of the second war] it was calculated that 80 
percent of Russian firepower was delivered by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters and 15-
17 percent by artillery.  The proportion of air strikes (publication date September 2000) 
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has fallen in recent months; according to the commander-in-chief of the Air Force 14,000 
sorties were flown in the first year of the war and 60 percent of Russian fire missions 
were air delivered.”177  According to Oliker, citing Russian Air Force sources, “accuracy 
improved significantly from the first war… and information sharing between forces and 
commanders increased.”178   
 There were still some problems with Russian battlefield communications in the 
second war.  MVD and Ministry of Defense forces still displayed some compatibility and 
coordination issues.179  Again, “Russian troops repeatedly rendered their advanced 
technology meaningless by communicating in the open.”180  On the whole, however, the 
Ministry of Defense has worked to provide more secure and reliable communication 
capability to its soldiers.  Previous chapters have described the simultaneous effort to 
target and knock down the Chechen guerrillas’ communication system.  The fact that 
Russia can successfully reintegrate coordination- and communications-intensive fire 
support methods from its experience in Afghanistan supports the conclusion that she has 
largely overcome the 1994-96 setbacks in battlefield communications. 
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 One is tempted to use an obvious trend in the two Chechen Wars to explain every 
phenomenon of the fighting.  Yes, terrorism has made a difference in the march of events.  
Of course the post-1989 erosion of Russian military capability is a factor in the Chechnya 
insurgency.  Neither, however, is useful in explaining the improved Russian performance 
in the second war, relative to the first.  One can show a disturbing picture of events at 
Budennovsk and describe it as terrorism; one can build a graph to describe Russian 
military erosion.  At the end of such an effort, one could certainly better identify terror or 
graphically represent known data.  However, taking a leading-edge paradigm in military-
technical thought and testing the events of a conflict against it may yield greater 
dividends for future warfighters because it necessitates departure from the left-brain 
mindset.  Using known metrics to make a point is easy; finding metrics to test compliance 
with a novel paradigm necessitates a step from what is known and easily charted to what 
is possible and conducive to innovation. 
 The “Neocortical” paradigm is one way to approach this task.  The Tofflers’ Third 
Wave concept says that the world is undergoing a technological revolution and that 
information is at the heart of it.  Technology has brought greater access to information 
than ever before and any paradigm through which the warfighter can manipulate that 
access becomes increasingly attractive.  In Richard Szafranski’s article “Neocortical 
Warfare: The Acme of Skill”, he charts the development of the brain from reptilian to 
limbic to “the capstone of the brain, as we know it today… the neocortex or neo-
mammalian brain…  It enables us to think, organize, remember, perceive, speak, choose, 
create, imagine and cope with or adapt to novelty (italics in original).”181  It follows that 
attaining an advantage in neocortical processes, while disrupting an adversary’s 
processes, will ensure victory.  At the same time, Szafranski posits that “adversaries will 
wage—are waging even as you read this—Neocortical Warfare against us…  It is 
prosecuted against our weaknesses or uses our strengths to weaken us in imaginative 
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ways.”182  It is therefore implicit that protecting one’s own forces from such an attack is 
an important component in the neocortical paradigm. 
 Similarities to the concept of Psychological Operations are visible.  In evaluating 
Neocortical Warfare, one should therefore also consider the Department of Defense 
definition of PSYOP: 
Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals.  The purpose of psychological 
operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior 
favorable to the originator’s objectives.183 
These operations certainly represent one component of the Russian brain war in 
Chechnya.  The key phrase in this definition, however, is “foreign audiences”.  
Szafranski’s paradigm certainly encompasses PSYOP, but safeguarding one’s own 
OODA loop is equally important.  Psychological Operations therefore are treated in this 
paper as an arrow in the neocortical quiver.  Again, the ultimate purpose of Neocortical 
Warfare is to manipulate the perceptions of both one’s own and the adversary’s forces. 
 If scholars look to the current situation in Chechnya, two things are immediately 
visible.  First, the opposing sides hold different perceptions of this conflict: 
Following a long tradition, the Russian government has defined the 
conflict as a struggle against banditry and terrorism—much as it did in 
Central Asia in the 1920s and early 1930s, and in Afghanistan in the late 
1970s and 1980s.  This legitimizes Russia’s course of actions, however 
ruthless the means, as a police function in the name of public order.  The 
Chechens, meanwhile, refer to their war as a “struggle for national and 
political liberation” and an Islamic holy war, or jihad.  Neither side sees 
the conflict as a civil war.  Russia will not honor the Chechens with 
political legitimacy, and Chechens refuse to accept the idea that they were 
ever voluntarily a part of the Russian Empire, Soviet state, or Russian 
Federation.184 
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 Second, conditions conducive to winning wars have not improved much for either 
adversary.  In mid-July 2004, for example, President Putin fired the chief of his general 
staff (Kvashnin), the top man in the Interior Ministry forces (Tikhomirov), the 
commander of the North Caucasus Military District (Labunets), and the deputy head of 
the FSB (Yezhkov).  “The other three were punished for last month’s brazen separatist 
raid on Ingushetia, neighboring the rebel region of Chechnya, in which 90 people were 
killed, analysts said.  Kvashnin’s dismissal followed a decree by Putin cutting the powers 
of the general staff and reducing it to a department of the Defense Ministry.”185 
 This may represent the final act in a well-known conflict between Kvashnin and 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov for control of the Russian military.  This state of affairs 
has existed since Kvashnin became Chief of Staff in 1997 and has constrained any effort 
to launch needed military reforms.  “He has persistently clashed with defense ministers, 
calling for a buildup of massive ground forces at the expense of more sophisticated and 
modern branches of the military.”186  Unity of command is hard to envision while Ivanov 
and Kvashnin fought; perhaps this new development will provide the Russian Ministry of 
Defense more clear and coherent guidance for readiness, budgeting, and doctrine.  This 
may also help Russian political leadership to match its goals with military capabilities. 
 “Wars,” writes Barry Posen in The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, 
and Germany Between the World Wars, “seem to take on a life of their own.  If these 
dangerous means are to be controlled, every effort must be made to subject them to the 
minimal discipline of political goals.”187  Again, Putin’s stated goals in Chechnya have 
evolved over time: “to repel Chechen aggression” (August-September 1999), to seek a 
“sanitary boundary”, or to fence in Chechen terror (October 1999).  In November 1999 
Putin wanted to totally destroy Chechnya’s terrorists and on New Years’ Day 2000 he 
wanted to preserve Russia’s integrity.188  Again, one wonders if a more unified Russian 
Ministry of Defense will better help Putin match political goals with actual military 
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means.  One must also consider the fact that other Russian ministries send armed people 
into the conflict; the MVD, Border Guards, FSB, and Ministry of Emergency Situations 
all have a stake in the Chechnya operation.189  Coordinating their efforts in a wide range 
of missions has historically been a bumpy journey.  Tightening up the military-political 
chain of command in Moscow is certainly a step in the right direction, especially when its 
counterpart in Grozny is experiencing difficulties of its own. 
 Days before Kvashnin was fired, the acting president of Chechnya, Sergei 
Abramov, was nearly killed by a roadside improvised explosive device; an explosion in 
May of 2004 assassinated his predecessor, Kadyrov.190  This is a symptom of the 
lawlessness that now permeates Chechen society.  Putin’s wrestling with the correct 
syntax for dealing with this state of affairs is not hard to visualize; Russia, after all, bears 
some responsibility.  In 1993 the Kremlin stopped paying Chechen pensions and salaries 
while cutting the region off from the central banking system.  Chechnya’s porous border 
and Grozny airport’s frequent visitors from throughout the Middle East helped turn the 
recently-neglected capital into “a perfect place through which to channel dirty deals”191 
and home to a vigorous (amongst other “unrecognized republics” in the Caucasus) black 
market economy.  The Chechen oil system, by the time of Dudayev’s death, had 
collapsed as thieves siphoned pipelines and stole the industry’s equipment for later black 
market transactions.192  Oil extraction, however, was not the only well-equipped Soviet 
endeavor in the Caucasus.  The years between 1991 and 1994 constituted a period “when 
rogue elements in the Russian armed forces were selling off weapons and it is logical to 
presume that the former Soviet general-turned-president Dudayev was buying.”193 
 When General Lebed and Chief of Staff of Chechen armed forces Aslan 
Maskhadov signed the Khasavyurt agreement on 12 May 1997, its terms dictated that 
Russia would help finance Chechnya’s reconstruction.  Unfortunately, this—and most 
other international aid—has not arrived, and Chechnya continues its downward spiral; the 
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subsequent economic instability is ominous when one examines recent demographic 
trends.  Chechnya’s three universities have been largely destroyed, so providing higher 
education to young citizens is hardly feasible, while any working teachers are living on 
donations.  Meanwhile, writing for the Strategic & Combat Studies Institute, scholar 
C.W. Blandy cites Russian statistics that say nearly 80 percent of the Chechen population 
is without work because the war has wiped out most of the industrial infrastructure and 
only 10 percent are employed in legitimate business.194  Landmines have been sown in 
“15 percent of the republic’s arable land… which greatly affected agriculture, reducing 
output and depriving the population of another avenue of legitimate employment.”195  A 
massive population of unemployed 15-30 year old males walking around a city in the 
United States makes any metropolitan police force wary; imagine keeping order in a city 
where many of these young men are carrying assault rifles or RPGs.  This problem, 
however, is not unique to Chechnya.  The recent 9/11 Commission Report asserts that: 
By the 1990s, high birthrates and declining rates of infant mortality had 
produced a common problem throughout the Muslim world: a large, 
steadily increasing population of young men without any reasonable 
expectation of suitable or steady employment—a sure prescription for 
social turbulence.  Many of these young men, such as the enormous 
number trained only in religious schools, lacked the skills needed by their 
societies.  Far more acquired valuable skills but lived in stagnant 
economies that could not generate satisfying jobs…  Frustrated in their 
search for a decent living, unable to benefit from an education often 
obtained at the cost of great family sacrifice, and blocked from starting 
families of their own, some of these young men were easy targets for 
radicalization.196 
This regional trend in demography, therefore, should concern any nation with stated 
security interests in the Muslim world; the leadership in such nations should pay attention 
to the Kremlin’s conduct in Chechnya. 
 Perhaps Putin (and most of his constituents, thanks to the aforementioned Public 
Affairs effort) perceives Chechnya’s problems as a cancer of instability.  In a 2000 report 
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to Congress, foreign affairs analyst Jim Nichol describes a metastasis of “economic and 
security problems” to states along Chechnya’s borders which included: 
…disruption of trade and transport through Chechnya, strains from hosting 
Chechen emigrants, drug and arms trafficking, and raids by Chechen 
criminals seeking booty or hostages to ransom.  To address these 
problems, Russia has been building railroads and pipelines around 
Chechnya, and setting up checkpoints, digging trenches, and stationing 
troops along the border with Chechnya.197 
 Nineteen months before jets slammed into the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, the U.S. intelligence community had similarly acknowledged Chechnya’s state 
of lawlessness and possible effects on international security: “In testimony to Congress 
on February 2, 2000, Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet tended to 
foresee lengthy Russian fighting in Chechnya to prevent the separatist region from 
‘becom[ing] the calling card of this millennium in terms of where do terrorists go and 
train and act.’  He warned that sympathizers from abroad were going to Chechnya to train 
and fight, and that they later could directly threaten U.S. interests.”198  If, like 
Afghanistan, Chechnya has become such a training ground for Islamic terror, Putin’s 
work to at least seal off the border and thus contain the cancer is understandably in the 
interests of Russian security.  The Kremlin’s efforts to excise this menace, again, are 
worthy of U.S. scrutiny, given the current state of international affairs. 
 Russian forces now occupying Chechnya are increasingly vulnerable to guerrilla 
activity.  To be sure, the average Chechen is tired of the fighting, devastation, and heavy-
handed treatment from Russian troops.  “The abuses, amounting to war crimes, 
committed by Russian soldiers, ensure that the Russian administration in Chechnya has 
no legitimacy in local eyes.”199  The fact that these abuses are still broadcast to the world 
via the latest information technology represents a development that Public Affairs and 
PSYOP planners in the United States should study.  The problems that digital cameras 
and the Internet have brought to the Kremlin are now just as applicable to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Photographed events of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison somehow were 
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transmitted to the international media and these acts certainly constituted a public 
relations disaster for the U.S. government.  In an environment where improvised 
explosive devices, urban firefights, and asymmetric attacks are common, Iraqi citizens 
may not feel secure enough to rebuild a viable nation-state.  The Abu Ghraib prison 
photos, broadcast not only via al-Jazeera but also the Internet, may have similarly eroded 
Iraqi support for U.S. policy in their country.  “‘The latest poll in Iraq has not been 
something that gives me a great deal of confidence,’ said Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa.  He 
noted that 71 percent of Iraqis say they depend for protection ‘on family and friends,’ not 
U.S. or Iraqi security forces… [and] 80 percent said they have ‘no confidence in U.S. or 
coalition authorities.’”200 
 Given the nasty asymmetric warfare and aforementioned attitudes of the populace 
in Chechnya toward Russian troops sent to protect them—ranging from frightened apathy 
to stark hostility, trivializing the Abu Ghraib prison scandal as a “college fraternity 
initiation”201 reveals a dangerous level of arrogance and ethnocentrism in certain 
American political circles.  William Bennett’s characterization of the photos as “al Qaeda 
recruiting posters,”202 given the foreign aid to both Chechen and Iraqi insurgents from 
Islamic nations and the insurgents’ alleged ties to Osama bin Ladin203, is more grounded 
in reality.  An army of occupation that abuses the native populace will find it increasingly 
difficult to hide these activities.  The moment these activities are broadcast (whether via 
the Internet or international media), insurgents gain support.  Given analysis of Public 
Affairs between the Chechen wars, one understands the importance of government efforts 
to control the flow of information both within and outside a battlespace.  Proactive 
manipulation of the information flow, however, is just as important as its reactive 
counterpart.  Greater effort to provide the right information to one’s own decision-makers 
may have averted some initial catastrophe in 1994. 
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 Herodotus said “No one is so foolish as to prefer war to peace: in peace children 
bury their fathers, while in war fathers bury their children.”204  This monograph has 
shown that Russia attempted during the relative peace between 1996 and 1999 to entomb 
some of their fathers’ inappropriate doctrinal assumptions.  In 1994, however, a quick 
look at earlier lessons learned (most recently in Afghanistan, for example) could have 
influenced a less painful learning curve for Russian soldiers in the first invasion.  Some 
enterprising young staff officer—even one ignorant of the region’s culture and history—
could have presented to his superiors the Russian Empire’s experience in the nineteenth 
century Caucasus, where “unequivocal superiority of Russian tactical firepower, the 
product of the combined force of separate military arms and disciplined maneuver, only 
achieved telling effect when the enemy was forced to wage battle on conventional 
terms.”205  Even then, “conventional terms” meant neither mountains, nor forests, nor 
cities.  While Tsarist Russia’s operations to subdue Chechnya represent a goldmine of 
useful lessons, the subsequent effort to transmit lessons learned would have been useful 
for peacetime study as well: 
The Caucasian experience left only a modest legacy for the Russian Army.  
From an institutional perspective, no systematic effort was made to 
preserve and disseminate the lessons of the Caucasian theater, which had 
little relevance to European warfare.  Even Miliutin, who served as war 
minister from 1861 to 1881 and whose analysis of the war proved so vital, 
subsequently became preoccupied with modernization of the Russian 
Army in a desperate effort to achieve parity with Germany and Austria.  
Furthermore, the long and bloody struggle in the Caucasus soiled many 
more reputations than it enhanced…  Russia remained preoccupied with 
the greater threat of warfare on the European continent, and the events of 
the Caucasus did not become an essential part of the army’s institutional 
memory.  Within two generations, vital tenets of irregular and mountain 
warfare would have to be learned anew (italics mine).206 
This failure to record and disseminate lessons learned in battle is not exclusively a 
Russian phenomenon, but a facet of organizational behavior.  “Once military 
organizations have prepared such standard scenarios,” writes Barry Posen in his 1984 
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study of military doctrine, “they have an interest in finding ways to impose the scenarios 
on their adversaries through offensive action.”207  The 1994 invasion of Chechnya 
certainly bears him out, and in this light the hypothetical young staff officer would have 
been told to forget about the 19th century in order to focus on the desired operation. 
 Posen’s book also suggests, however, that failure stimulates innovation in 
organizations208, and the failure of the 1994 invasion has certainly facilitated innovation 
in Russian forces.  “Strategic cultures,” writes John Arquilla, “like those of the Russian 
military ‘do not go gentle into that good night,’ and the way they respond to the 
experience of war in Chechnya may provide lessons for all militaries as they contemplate 
the context and conduct of future wars.”209  What will these future wars look like and 
what lessons from Chechnya will apply to them? 
 The 1999 RAND study Countering the New Terrorism points out that terrorism is 
an asymmetric war strategy which adversaries will increasingly employ against more 
conventional powers; “it may also represent an attractive means of striking at the United 
States directly, for symbolism or revenge, and as a means of influencing public opinion 
when the costs and benefits of intervention are in debate.  Some of these objectives might 
be achieved simply through the threat of terrorist attacks (italics in original).”210  This 
passage serves to illuminate terror as a tool in the asymmetric warrior’s kit.  The sentence 
regarding “threat,” however, hints at a possible preventive measure for the more 
conventional adversary. 
 The RAND study forecasts further that “unconventional terrorist attacks on the 
sinews of modern, information-intensive societies will become the norm, largely 
replacing conventional conflicts over the control of territory or people.  Carried to its 
logical conclusion, this is a future in which terrorism of all sorts, and especially 
information-related terrorism, becomes a more pervasive phenomenon, or even the 
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dominant mode of war.”211  Recent trends toward both asymmetry and urbanization in 
conflict thus make it imperative that policy-makers posit a solution to the inherent 
information warfare problem. 
A. GROWING ASYMMETRY AND URBANIZATION 
 In his article on Chechen guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev, analyst Raymond C. 
Finch III uses the analogy of a football game to symbolize traditional force-on-force 
combat.  He theorizes, however, that as the nation-state erodes, the game changes and his 
analogy adapts accordingly: 
Alongside the deterioration of the state, the opposing team’s military has 
broken up, and some of these players have moved up into the stands, 
wreaking all sorts of havoc.  While the US military must still prepare to 
defend against the traditional opposing team of a state-sponsored military, 
it is increasingly called upon to help settle fights in the stands…  It cannot 
remain on the playing field, waiting for an opposing team to appear, while 
chaos reigns in the stands.212 
The “team” is tasked to go into the bleachers and establish order; the military, of course 
shuns this activity and mentions that there are other organizations better equipped for the 
situation in the stands; the team prefers to secure the field using its tried-and-true 
strategic playbook. 
 The difference between the Russian football team and the unruly insurgents in the 
stands puts her at a disadvantage.  “Where the Russians fought to control and hold a 
territory, the rebels fought to make controlling and holding the territory as unpleasant as 
possible… [and t]o the Russians, territory captured was territory won.  To the rebels, 
territory lost was a temporary retreat to regroup and attack once again.”213  In effect, the 
Russian goal was to seize and hold real estate while the Chechen goal was to attrite 
Russian forces.  Chechen commander Tourpal Ali-Kaimov recalled that “We knew we 
could not meet them in the conduct of conventional combat and win.  However, we knew 
that if we met them in the urban environment we might be able to ‘punish’ them… [and] 
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we now know that the city battlefield offers us distinct advantages.”214  The Chechens, 
refusing to obediently form up on the 50-yard-line, thus adapted well to the bleachers and 
stayed there. 
 Russia, with its technology and firepower advantage, is grappling with the kind of 
war that Western militaries will increasingly confront.  The asymmetric strategy will only 
become more prevalent.  “Such a strategy seeks to apply one’s strength to an adversary’s 
perceived weaknesses, knowing that a strength-on-strength approach would be less 
profitable.  Putting a strong opponent into unfamiliar and complex territory, blunting his 
edges in information gathering and command and control, and setting him among an 
unfriendly population are all tactics that embody asymmetric thinking.”215  Part of the 
problem lies in entrenched traditions of training for force-on-force scenarios and then 
attempting to manipulate enemies into fighting conventional battles.  America’s own 
military history holds examples of this error—“‘find, fix, fight, and finish’ the enemy 
became a much-repeated slogan during the Vietnam War,”216 after all, and the 
asymmetric-oriented foe in that conflict certainly outlasted American resolve. 
 Scholar Robert M. Cassidy, in his work on Soviet/Russian operations in 
Afghanistan and Chechnya, wrote that “if the Russian military wants to be successful in 
small wars, it needs to cultivate a mindset and doctrine that does not focus exclusively on 
the big war paradigm and it needs to become an institution that can learn, innovate, and 
adapt…  It also requires good intelligence and a very precise and minimal application of 
lethal force.”217  This conditional statement, however, can hardly be confined to Russia. 
Any expeditionary combatant with a conventional force—one who holds the 
advantage in technology and firepower—will need to cultivate these capabilities.  The 
United States, with its post-Cold War shift from forward deployment to expeditionary 
forces, should also train for the urbanization of combat.  Airfields and ports are critical to 
expeditionary operations and both are mostly found adjacent to metropolitan areas.  If 
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these facilities “are located in a non-allied country and the locals welcome US forces, that 
feeling may change and fighting break out, as illustrated in Mogadishu [in October 1993 
and described in Black Hawk Down by Mark Bowden].  If the locals are not initially 
happy with the arrival of US forces, the first battle may well be urban.”218 
Cassidy also wrote that the Chechen urbanization of the conflict was a natural 
outgrowth of their past successes against the Tsar’s troops in forest warfare.  Further, by 
taking it to the city, “they could negate Russian advantages in firepower in open terrain 
from helicopters, combat aircraft, and tanks; and they could blend in with the local 
population to their advantage.”219  This paper has previously examined the Russian 
countermeasure to urbanization—reliance on heavy firepower to transform the three-
dimensional city landscape to two dimensions.  History has shown, however, in examples 
such as the 1942 battle of Stalingrad, that “a city destroyed by artillery and bombs is just 
as good as an intact one for conducting guerrilla operations against conventional 
forces.”220  The world’s demographic trends also make the urbanization of warfare more 
likely: “The UN projects that by 2025, 60 percent of the world’s population (5 billion 
people) will live in urban areas.”221  For a commander defending a city, more 
noncombatants are a benefit: one can force noncombatants to both erect and man 
defenses and even the presence of idle noncombatants increases the possibility of 
collateral damage when the enemy attacks. 
Any future insurgent with a TV could have learned the lessons in real-time from 
the first Gulf War—open terrain forces one to fight on a conventional enemy’s terms and 
will probably bring a peace settlement on his terms as well: 
Maneuver forces may now be possible only in the cities as long as high-
precision systems dominate the open countryside.  Maneuver by fire may 
be the only maneuver possible in the countryside.  The presence of 
noncombatants and the nature of the city itself may render precision fire 
problematic.  Precision strikes can target specific industries, facilities, 
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military infrastructure and sectors as part of an overall plan of maneuver 
by fire, but they cannot occupy and hold a city.222 
Since Vietnam, when American families watched the war’s progress every night on 
television, the US government has been averse to conflicts holding high casualty 
potential.  The current situation in Iraq, however, has moved largely to the cities as 
insurgents target coalition forces with roadside bombs, snipers, and RPG attacks.  The 
United States could pull its troops back to the countryside and employ its overwhelming 
firepower against centers of unrest.  The Russian experience in Chechnya has, however, 
revealed shortcomings in this approach.  Again, to counter the inherent information 
aspects of both asymmetric warfare and terror, more developed nations need an 
information-intensive paradigm upon which to base action. 
B. NEOCORTICAL WARFARE 
 Between the first and second wars in Chechnya, the Russian Federation showed 
improvement in important information-intensive aspects of modern warfare.  Intelligence 
assets better collected and disseminated both battlefield events and characteristics to 
decision-makers.  The reconnaissance-strike cycle was accordingly shortened and 
contributed to a more efficient and diligent targeting effort against Chechen assets.  The 
Putin administration threw a Public Affairs lasso around battlefield journalists and 
proactively harnessed the Russian population to its operations in Chechnya via appeals to 
both securing the nation and fighting terror.  Great progress occurred in preparing 
Russian soldiers for the psychological pressures of modern combat.  The technical 
problems inherent in communications support to a conventional force confronted Russian 
forces in the second war—secure communications and adequate satellite capacity 
represented recurring issues.  The fact that Russian commanders could better support, 
defend, and escort ground formations with heavy artillery and close air support, however, 
supports the case for overall improvement in battlefield communications; so does the 
increase in Russian interception of Chechen communications traffic and location of 
Chechen transceivers. 
 The matrix described in this paper’s introduction therefore remains intact. 
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Case IPB PA PSYOP Battlefield Comms 
1994 Limited Limited Limited Limited 
1999 Improved Improved Improved Improved 
Table 2. Matrix 
Between 1994 and 1999 the Russians paid attention to each of these factors: Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Battlefield 
Communications.  Neocortical Warfare, however is, again, “warfare that strives to 
control or shape the behavior of enemy organisms, but without destroying the organisms.  
It does this by influencing, even to the point of regulating, the consciousness, perceptions 
and will of the adversary’s leadership: the enemy’s neocortical system (italics in 
original).”223  Each of the factors listed above holds influence over combatants’ 
consciousness, perceptions, and will—therefore a developments in each are applicable to 
neocortical analysis.  Have the Russian forces enhanced capabilities in right-brain factors 
on the battlefield?  Absolutely.  This improvement, however, lay in controlling and 
shaping behavior in Russian organisms. 
 Firming up the resolve in Russian soldiers and citizenry has yielded serious 
dividends, but these PSYOP and PA activities are not oriented toward the Chechens.  
Little evidence exists to support the conclusion that Russian measures have altered 
perceptions in either Chechen soldiers or citizens.  The perception of danger to one’s 
family and livelihood has forced thousands of Chechens to emigrate, but both sides have 
facilitated this exodus and neither profits from it. 
Neocortical Warfare, therefore, does not currently apply to the Chechen 
battlespace.  Russia faces both terrorism and asymmetric strategy within that 
battlespace—styles of conflict heavy with information, perception, and communication 
aspects.  Russia between 1994 and 1999 worked to manipulate the battlefield reports its 
society received from Chechnya, to improve the perception of its troops and intelligence 
analysts, and to solidify the communication apparatuses necessary to improve battlefield 
performance. 
Russian sources reveal at least an interest in neocortical matters.  A 2003 book by 
Russian Information Warfare expert S.P. Rastorguyev defines the information weapon as 
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a “means directed at activating (or blocking) information system processes in which the 
subject using the weapons has an interest.”  Further, an information weapon “can be any 
technical, biological, or social means or system that is used for the purposeful production, 
processing, transmitting, presenting or blocking of data and or processes that work with 
the data.”224  The same year, in the naval journal Morskoi Sbornik, Captain First Rank 
(Reserve) R. Bikkenin explained that Russian doctrine had delineated information 
warfare into information-technical and the softer information-psychological spheres.  The 
information-psychological realm emphasized effects on perceptions of both civilian and 
military people, rather than electronic assets. 225  These analysts emphasize manipulating 
both the message and the target audiences; Neocortical Warfare’s use of information to 
“influenc[e], even to the point of regulating, the consciousness, perceptions and will,”226 
is strikingly similar. 
The best argument one can therefore make for Neocortical Warfare in the Russian 
forces is this: Via its attention to right-brain, softer aspects of warfare, Russian military 
theory is moving in that direction (and may be the most advanced in the world).  The 
evidence says Russian military practice is far less developed toward that goal. 
The “thumping the beehive” analogy is apt.  The Russian colossus that marched 
back toward Grozny in 1999 was better equipped, better prepared, and more aware of his 
surroundings.  He had exchanged a sledge for a shotgun and, while this weapon was not 
likely to destroy the bees’ resolve, it could obliterate their home.  Better IPB had 
removed his blindfold, PA had garnered the partygoers’ support for his endeavors, and he 
had learned from previous stings (even if he had to relearn the pain of his previous 
confrontation with the Afghanistan hive): 
In stark contrast to 1994, the troops who entered Grozny in 1999 were a 
sizable force, reasonably well-supplied, that had the benefit of better 
training.  A unified chain of command ensured that air and artillery 
support  would   be  forthcoming  and   that  different  forces  knew  their  
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missions.  Most important, they had a plan for capturing Grozny, and they 
had commanding officers whose orders were clear on the need to avoid 
casualties.227 
The Russian was sure of his movements this time, but if the bees concentrated for an 
attack he could step back a bit and blast away at the source.  The enemy had an instinct 
and a structure perfect for defending his home.  “[Chechen guerrillas] were very much 
habituated to the decentralization of authority… [and] they had both the organizational 
suppleness and technical wherewithal needed to mount swarming attacks, then to dissever 
and disperse, recombining later to resume the offensive.”228 
This situation can endure for a long time.  The Russian Federation, no matter what 
financial challenges it faces, will not run out of either shotgun or artillery shells in the 
foreseeable future.  The Chechen resistance is unlikely to forget losses in either the 
current or past contests and, unless something changes, will continue to swarm and sting 
the intruder.  Chechen terror has also set a precedent for stings inside Russia’s house if 
the hive’s success wanes. 
To carry the analogy to its conclusion, one must also remember the ideal 
arrangement for a man and a nearby hive: the man protects the colony while the bees toil 
away and provide him honey.  Again, this is an apropos metaphor when one considers the 
former Soviet Union and the oil it harvested from the Caucasus.  Somewhere in man’s 
history, he stopped attacking hives and tried to learn something about the social habits 
and motivations of bees; perhaps this event could serve as a model for future Russian 
relations with Chechnya.  Attempts to manipulate a swarm into perceiving itself as a 
piñata have heretofore yielded little success. 
Fortunately, at least two members of the House Armed Services Committee 
understand the importance of strengthening this metaphorical apiculture.  “The status of 
the subject matter experts—be they civil affairs officers skilled in building the institutions 
needed for a successful society or foreign-area officers with a deep understanding of the 
cultural and social forces at play in the region—must be elevated…  These experts must 
be represented in greater numbers both in the staffs of operational headquarters and down 
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at the muddy-boot level.”229  The United States has held the capability—tucked away in 
silos, submarines, and bomb bays—to vaporize any nest of trouble for almost 60 years.  
A sterile left-brain analysis may find this approach acceptable.  Results would be 
immediate; the enemy and his potential to harm friendly interests would be eliminated.  
Obviously, as revealed in the previous statement, Congressmen Ike Skelton (D-MO) and 
Steve Israel (D-NY) see the benefits of having right-brain perspectives available to 
military decision-makers.  As this paper has shown, future wars will not be so clear, 
concise, and conventional—expeditionary militaries will need regional experts to assist in 
controlling and shaping an adversary’s perceptions and behavior. 
 This is the problem: It is very difficult to graft a strategic paradigm based on 
Boyd’s OODA loop to asymmetric conflict.  One must remember that the origins of this 
theory are found in MiG Alley, where John Boyd flew the F-86 during the Korean War.  
In air combat, speed and surprise are emphasized; these qualities depend upon the pilots’ 
relative situational awareness.  Errors are fatal.  If a given pilot’s perceptions and 
responses are superior, therefore, to the adversary’s, that given pilot will win.  Victory is 
obvious.  If the enemy’s aircraft becomes a smoking hole in the landscape or his 
parachute pops open below the melee, then the other pilot wins: 
Mismatches between the real world and our mental images of that world 
generate inaccurate responses.  These, in turn, produce confusion and 
disorientation, which then diminish both the accuracy and the speed of 
subsequent decision making.  Left uncorrected, disorientation steadily 
expands one’s OODA loop until it eventually becomes a death trap.230 
One can imagine the advocate of this theory simulating dogfighting adversaries with his 
hands when describing the OODA loop with its tighter turn radius and consistent need for 
both cockpit-type situational awareness and initiative in the engagement.  Asymmetric 
warfare differs from air-to-air engagements, which evolve faster and derive clear 
victories over an adversary. 
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 Such a paradigm would work if the hypothetical Russian protagonist were 
fighting a duel rather than a beehive; the fact that most people have two hands and that 
each hand is similar to its partner in size and shape would adequately convey the 
engagement.  Try to imagine, however, a person pantomiming the fight between a man 
and a hive with only two hands—through his gestures one could simulate swinging, 
shooting, or writhing in pain.  Again, this is apropos since Russia’s neocortical progress 
lay in preparing her own people and soldiers; her actions have not yet seriously affected 
the right brain of the Chechen insurgency.   
 Boyd’s concept is replete with the air combat analogy of turning inside the 
opponent and making the kill, a simpler situation that is more quickly resolved than 
pacifying a swarm of angry assailants.  Engaging a hive necessitates a longer-term, more 
complex paradigm—one that envisions conflict in terms of strategic war, rather than a 
tactical skirmish.  To describe the asymmetric and information aspects of the Russian 
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